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8Preface
The General Secretary of the Kola Science Centre Anatoly Vinogradov looked puzzled.
He was sitting in a comfortable chair in his spacious office of the Science Centre in
Apatity, some 200 kilometres south of the city of Murmansk, looking at a sketch of a
project I had just outlined on a piece of cross-ruled paper. The project I had proposed
would estimate the by-product flows of the major industrial enterprises of the region,
with an aim to add value to the region’s products while at the same time reducing
environmental emissions, which in the Kola Peninsula were known to be significant. The
suggestion relied heavily on industrial ecology, a new approach to environmental
management with which successful projects of the kind had been made in Europe. I had
for the past three weeks been attending an interdisciplinary PhD course organized by the
Circumpolar Arctic Environmental Studies Network in the Kola Peninsula and, having in
a short time increased my knowledge about the region’s industrial infrastructure and
environmental problems tremendously, started to feel increasingly eager to learn more
about them in an industrial ecology framework.
“This sounds interesting”, said General Secretary Vinogradov in a few minutes. “You
see, we have a long experience about doing things this way.” Now it was my turn to look
puzzled. Vinogradov casually dug out a rugged-edged book published by the Kola
Science Centre nearly 20 years earlier. The book contained a detailed study of the
integration of the entire heavy industry in the Kola Peninsula, with estimates of waste
reduction potential and novel products. “We call it complex utilization and it is an idea of
the academician Fersman from the 1930s.” The plans contained a striking similarity to
the models of industrial ecology and, as I was to learn later on, so did the underlying
philosophy.
The discussion in the General Secretary’s office in Apatity on the fair September day in
2001 started a six-year-long process that led to the compilation of the PhD dissertation at
hand. How was it possible that industrial ecology, having gained a fairly widespread
reputation in the West of being a new way of looking at human-environment interaction,
had been common knowledge to the mining experts of the Kola Peninsula for decades?
And, more importantly, how was it that no one in the West had given this knowledge any
further thought? “I would give you this document”, continued Chairman Vinogradov
almost as if he had heard my silent questions, “but unfortunately the book has been
declared confidential by the Government up until the year of 2002”.
In May 2002 I was finally allowed to lay my hands on the document. An exciting journey
into the peculiar industrial tradition of the Kola Peninsula began. A round of data
collection started soon after the first visit to Apatity. By the spring of 2005, I had made
52 thematic interviews among the relevant stakeholder groups in the Kola Peninsula,
reviewed more than 100 publications by different stakeholder groups, and collected
detailed production and emission data from four of the region’s largest mining companies
covering a 25-year time span. The empirical research led to the publication of four
9international peer reviewed journal articles, which form the corpus of this doctoral
dissertation.
While the data gave a coherent picture of the environmental emissions of the mining
industries in the Kola Peninsula, it became clear during the research process that no new
ways of optimizing resource use in the Kola Peninsula would be achieved. The research
would certainly provide a general-level description of resource use problems in the
region—and careful suggestions of reformulating those problems as a way towards
resolving them. But it stood clear that industrial ecology as a policy recommendation
would not stand and defend itself in the case region. The reason was that the models of
industrial ecology I had in mind when entering the field were the very models that had
failed in the region 15 years earlier. These models that were crystallized in the plan
presented to me by General Secretary Vinogradov, although great on paper, never took
off in reality. To my surprise, however, it appeared that the plan, and the underlying
arguments for its promotion, had remained nearly unaltered the past 75 years: the
communist scientists of the 1930’s, the scientists of détente of the 1980’s, and the market
oriented scientists of the 2000’s all have seen the plan as a solution to a range of
environmental and economic problems. The Kola Science Centre, a strongly mining-
engineering oriented research hub, even established a unit to carry out the plan in 1988
with the emblematic name “Institute of Economic Problems”.
Why, was my next question, would the production models of industrial ecology enjoy
increasing popularity in the Nordic countries, such as Finland, Denmark and Norway, but
not across the Finnish border in the Kola Peninsula? Obviously, there is some unexplored
set of criteria in industrial ecology that makes the concept applicable in some contexts but
not in others. What are these criteria? They will certainly change when perceptions of the
environment change from one cultural context to the next. This means that environmental
governance (defined as a set of mechanisms through which people interact in the context
of the environment) plays a crucial role. To go further into governance, I chose to anchor
the dissertation to corporate strategy and public policy. The underlying intellectual
challenge was to uncover the process by which governance comes into being from the
interaction between policy and strategy. The following pages draw together the
contributions from a series of journal articles and illustrate ways in which strategy and
policy interact. In addition, I will make recommendations to environmental strategy and
policy in the Barents Euro-Arctic region.
Apart from Anatoly Vinogradov and his great insight, I would like to express my
gratitude to many people in the Kola Science centre: Ludmila Ivanova, Vladimir Didyk,
Vladimir Selin, Fedor Larichkin, Galina Charitonova, Larissa Ryabova, and many others
who have helped me in collecting material and just plain surviving in the arctic. At
Helsinki University of Technology, my colleagues and advisors at the Laboratory of
Environmental Protection; Henrik Bruun, Katri Huutoniemi, Maria Höyssä, Nina Janasik,
Richard Langlais, Mikko Rask, Martti Timonen and Aino Toppinen have had an
immense impact on my work. I am particularly in debt to Aino Toppinen who has helped
me to formulate some of the fundamental arguments in this dissertation. Joint writing
with Nina Tynkkynen has given me an opportunity to critically review this dissertation at
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its very final stages. My supervisor, Janne Hukkinen, has done a tremendous work in
guiding me, first through a master’s thesis and later through the PhD. Richard Howarth of
Dartmouth College, a mentor and a dear friend, has put a lot of effort in reviewing and
guiding my work. Thank you all ever so much. Finally, I would like to thank my
family—Aino, Kaisa, Kari, Marie, Otso, Paavo, Raili and Toni—for supporting my long
journey in the student world.
This dissertation has been financially supported by a number of institutions: The
Academy of Finland with the projects 68801 (2002), 102260 (2003-2005) and 118179
(2007-2008); Svenska tekniska vetenskapsakademien i Finland with two consecutive
grants (2006-2007); and by the Graduate School of Environmental Social Science
(YHTYMÄ) (2003-2005).
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1. Introduction
On the face of it, things are beginning to look bright in the Kola Peninsula. The industry
of the region is gradually reviving from the punch it took in the privatization process in
1993 and again during the economic downturn in 1998. The year 2006 saw the highest
level of foreign investment—USD 101,9 million—in the region’s history. The same goes
for commodity exports, which exceeded USD 2,5 billion in 2006. In the social sector, the
real average per capita income has increased above the average Russian level, and death
rate showed a decrease for the first time in 8 years (Didyk and Riabova, 2007). The net
level of industrial pollution, which up until now has caused significant environmental
degradation in the Kola Peninsula, has decreased by 50% between 1991 and 2001 due to
the simultaneous reduction in production volumes and the introduction of cleaner
technology (Murmansk-Oblkomstat, 2001).
The decreasing level of industrial pollution in the Kola Peninsula and other industrial
regions has had a far-reaching impact on the environmental policy of Russia. As the
reduction of emission volumes was a typical phenomenon at the time of the Soviet Union
downfall, the federal government has since then been able to take a range of actions that
rest on claims of an improved environmental profile of the country. The government’s
ratification of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate change, for instance, has been seen as
a political chip by which Russia attempts to re-achieve its status as a great power, and as
a tactical move to secure considerable income from international carbon dioxide trade in
the future (Tynkkynen, 2005). Yet the federal government has shown little interest in
resolving a number of long-term environmental problems related to emissions from
industry. These emissions continue to raise concern in the localities where they are
created and, as will become clear in the following pages, across national borders as well.
The Russian government’s environmental policy is weak not because of low pollution
levels. Although lower than before, they still exceed the typical values in the West by
orders of magnitude. In the Kola Peninsula, sulphur was emitted in 2003 from the
region’s cupro-nickel smelters in amounts exceeding the net national sulphur emission of
Finland (Article 1, Statistics Finland, 2006). Unlike carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide does
not travel very far from the source and does not in a strict sense contribute to global
environmental change1. Its local ecosystem effects, however, are significant. These
effects are highlighted in regions with high level point sources such as the Kola
Peninsula, in particular as they are accompanied by emissions of heavy metals (AMAP,
1998). Pollutants continuing to pose more subtle threats to the region’s ecosystems
include airborne phosphorus from the apatite industry. Both of the aforementioned
pollution issues raise concern among the citizens of the Kola Peninsula as well as across
the border in Finland, Sweden and Norway. Surely, anyone travelling through the cities
of Monchegorsk and Nikel in the Kola Peninsula during the summertime is able to see the
1 Anthropogenic sulfate aerosols are, however, a leading explanation for the global cooling that occurred in
the 1950s and 1960s. In this way, sulfur dioxide emissions do have global impacts that partly offset the
effects caused by rising greenhouse gas concentrations.
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total devastation of ecosystems caused by the long term sulphur dioxide and heavy metals
emissions from the copper-nickel smelters there.
The Nordic countries have been particularly active in attempting to control the mining-
related pollution in the Kola Peninsula through co-operation. To an important degree, this
co-operation has been based on a number of multilateral and bilateral treaties and policy
statements, such as the agreement on the reduction of Long Range Transboundary Air
Pollution (LRTAP) signed by the Soviet Union in 1979, the Finnish-Soviet joint venture
on restructuring the Pechenganikel works in the Kola Peninsula in 1989, and the Russo-
Nordic ministerial declaration on the Barents region environment in 1992. The longest
enduring and perhaps the most influential of these treaties is the restructuring project of
Pechenganikel, which has been repeatedly renegotiated for the past 18 years. Despite the
treaties and policy statements, however, foreign counterparts involved in environmental
co-operation continue to wonder whether they negotiate with the correct government
level or whether the government is the correct partner to negotiate with in the first place.
A key cause of this dilemma is the volatility of Russian environmental governance. For
the foreign counterparts, the dilemma becomes visible in prolonged periods of project
implementation due to constant changes or even loss of project partners (Darst, 2001).
The interplay of Russian environmental governance and international co-operation should
be better understood for more effective co-operation.
On the technical side, attempts to solve the pollution problems in the Kola Peninsula have
been numerous. Some of these attempts date back to the late 1970s, some even to the
early 1930s. The more recent attempts, during the 1990s and 2000s, have on many
occasions been tied to the aforementioned international co-operation. Up until the early
1990s, technical solutions to environmental problems in the Kola Peninsula were based
on two interlinked strategies. First, pollutants would be captured at the end of the
enrichment process, with the so-called end-of-pipe technology, and stored in waste
deposits in the Kola Peninsula. In the second strategy, pollutants that previously were
emitted into the environment would be re-used within a complex structure combining
mining and metallurgy, chemical industry, and construction industry. This second
strategy is commonly known as “complex utilization” in the Kola Peninsula.
Complex utilization is in many ways analogous to the concept of industrial ecology,
which has gained notable academic and industrial interest since the early 1990s. A central
aspect of industrial ecology is that it is a metaphor: it suggests that natural ecosystems
can be used as models for industrial systems to achieve sustainability. Similarly, the
metaphor of complex utilization links properties of nonliving nature into industrial
practices. It conveys the idea that a complex mineral ore should be utilized in its
complexity; in other words, extracting all the components of an ore and converting them
to products. It does so by deriving design imperatives from one of the most important
minerals in the Kola Peninsula, apatite–nepheline of the Khibiny Mountains. Apatite–
nepheline is found in complex formations, which means that the mineral’s constitutive
compounds form strong physical bonds that require a number of processing stages if any
single compound is to be extracted. Thus, the word complex refers not only to the
Khibiny ore, but also to the entire industrial process that the ore is a part of (Article 4).
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The second analogy between industrial ecology and complex utilization is related to their
practical implications. Both concepts are directed toward the industrial processing of
natural resources and have similar prescriptions for industrial systems. According to
industrial ecology, industrial ecosystems are supposed to optimize the use of energy and
material through internal circulation. In the case of complex utilization, the complex
constitution of the natural resource dictates that, in order for it to be fully utilized, the
resource needs to be processed in a complex production system.
Third, the two concepts are analogous in that they have been created and cultivated by
scientific communities, which have also become the principal constructors and
communicators of the societal meanings and justifications of the scientific metaphors.
Through this political dimension of their activities, the scientific communities—including
scientists and possibly other intimately connected proponents who are initiated into the
science based concepts—have become involved in natural resource policy (Article 4).
This last point bears significance as it delineates some important aspects of the policy
networks in which complex utilization has been promoted (details to follow).
Since the early 1990s, the solutions to environmental problems have increasingly been
based on the increase of eco-efficiency through plant-specific modernization programs,
but rigorous end-of-pipe technology is still a widely used method to curb emissions. The
target emission levels that are expected to result from the application of these
environmental technologies are based on both Russian environmental regulation and
international negotiations. In the latter case, sustainability indicators retrieved from
international sustainability declarations have been proposed repeatedly, but their
effectiveness in the case study region is far from clear. In addition, production models for
sustainability, such as industrial ecology, while well received in Europe and in the US,
have failed to deliver the expected environmental benefits in the Russian context.
Importantly, the mining companies have during the 2000s adopted standardized
environmental management systems (EMS) largely due to consumer demand.
An exploration into the discrepancy between the effectiveness of sustainability indicators
and production models in different cultural contexts—North-West Europe and North-
West Russia—is important in two respects. First, it reveals previously hidden patterns of
political embedding of scientific models for human-environment interaction. Second, it
allows for a better understanding of the mechanisms with which indicators of human-
environment interaction are culturally contextualized. Both of these aspects are necessary
for the application of scientific concepts in resolving local environmental problems in the
global economy.
Put simply, corporate environmental strategy and public environmental policy in the Kola
Peninsula do not currently have much common ground. Yet strategy and policy are key
governance mechanisms. To achieve better environmental governance requires
understanding how strategy and policy interact. This introductory chapter links strategy
and policy in a coherent manner by using concepts from management and governance
theories. In particular, my empirical research pinpoints several dependencies between
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“strategic fit” and policy networks. In addition to these two concepts, the following pages
will make frequent reference to a number of theoretical concepts. As these concepts often
lack rigorous common definitions, I have developed a terminology specific for this
dissertation in Table 1.
Table 1. Theoretical concepts and their cross dependences as used in this dissertation
Concept Definition Cross dependence with other
concepts
Environmental management Form of organizational
management in which
environmental issues are brought
into decision making
Varies according to the
strategies with which the
organization engages its
stakeholders
Environmental strategy A framework guiding the
organization’s practices in the
context of the natural
environment
Part of environmental
management, influenced by
public policies
Strategic fit A measure of how well strategy is
in line with its context
Constructed in policy networks
Environmental governance Any set of mechanisms through
which groups of people work
together and/or interact in the
context of the environment
Governance mechanisms
include strategy and policy
Institutions “Humanly devised constraints
that shape human interaction”
(North, 1990: 3)
Institutional arrangements
(including public policies and
corporate strategies) affect the
performance of industrial
organizations
Environmental policy Concerns the structure and
content of state institutions
(environmental laws, regulations,
administrative practices and court
rulings)
Formed partly as a response to
corporate environmental
strategy
Policy networks Inter-organizational modes of
interaction through which distinct
organizational entities come into
contact.
Mediate between corporate
strategy and public policy
Human-environment indicators Repeated measurements of the
state, functionality and
performance of socio-ecological
systems
Contribute to policy network
building and community
processes
Environmental co-operation Agreed upon, planned or
implemented environmental work
by organizations from different
cultural contexts
Work in which institutions from
different cultures are contested
Although I extend the scope of this dissertation back to the Soviet time, where no private
corporations existed, the main viewpoint I apply is that of the industrial corporation. A
key rationale for this choice is that industrial companies have become important actors in
the environmental governance structure of Russia (details to follow). This means that
corporate environmental management has emerged as a central institution of
environmental governance in Russia. Having this in mind, I take up three distinct but
interrelated elements of corporate environmental management in this dissertation:
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Co-operationIndicators
P    R    I    V    A    T    I    Z    A    T    I    O    N
Complex utilization Centralized between
national governments
Emission levels, regional
eco-efficiency
Adaptation to
international
environmental standards
Emission levels,
profitability of eco-
efficiency
Fragmented between
different government and
business levels
Strategy
R   E -   C   E   N   T   R   A   L   I   Z   A   T   I   O   N
”Greening of
business” through
international
standards
Indicators
sensitive to co-
operation and the
market
Multilateral
bottom-up env.
programs
1990
2000
2015
Increased federal
involvement
Indicators of
complex
utilization
Complex
utilization re-
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environmental strategy, indicators of human-environment interaction and environmental
co-operation (Figure 1). The schematic in Figure 1 introduces two key processes in
Russian environmental governance: privatization and re-centralization. Three “snapshots”
are highlighted: 1990, 2000 and 2015. While the findings in the first two snapshots lay
the empirical grounds for this study, I use the third one to illustrate possible futures for
environmental strategy in the Kola Peninsula. The dominant environmental strategy in
the Kola Peninsula has shifted from complex utilization to adaptation to international
environmental standards. The two possible future outcomes are either the re-
establishment of complex utilization or the further “greening” of the mining business
through standards. Similarly, the key human-environment indicators within the mining
industry have undergone a transition from eco-efficiency towards profitability.
Analogous development paths are possible for indicators as for strategy: the first
alternative is conditioned on the market and co-operation, the other on complex
utilization. Finally, co-operation has changed from government-driven and centralized
into more fragmented and local. The potential futures in co-operation depend partly on
the dominant environmental strategy and can be increasingly based on multilateral local
environmental programs. Alternatively, increased federal involvement can be expected
should complex utilization be re-established.
Figure 1: Past, present and expected changes in environmental management in the Kola Peninsula
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The fundamental research question behind the dissertation emerges from the empirical
schematic in Figure 1: How do policy networks mediate between strategy and policy to
respond to, and to reconstitute, environmental governance? From the corporate
perspective, the solutions are embedded in corporate environmental strategy, in which
environmental indicators and co-operation with domestic and foreign partners play a key
role. But the corporation does not act alone with regard to the natural environment. Its
environmental strategy is guided and constrained by public environmental policy, which,
to make things more complicated, is formed partly as a response to the environmental
strategy of the corporation. Thus, the task of this dissertation is to analyze the
interdependence between corporate strategy and environmental policy.
By responding to the research question, the dissertation reveals some of the
environmental strategies with which the mining industry of the Kola Peninsula has
participated in the formation of environmental governance during the past 27 years. By
linking the environmental strategies to specific technical solutions—most of which are
being promoted in Europe and the US—the dissertation assesses conditions for success
and failure of these technical solutions. This approach brings forth a range of complex
issues. To start with, the strategies presented in Figure 1 are not entirely fixed to the time
periods. Parts of them continue to be promoted by various influential actors in the case
region, which signals strong heterogeneity and path dependence in the strategies. Path
dependence and heterogeneity, in turn, make visible the needs and demands in different
cultural contexts and governance structures, and the need for them to be incorporated into
corporate environmental management. The central message of this dissertation, therefore,
is to instruct how to do the incorporation successfully. In international environmental co-
operation, cultural contextualization of environmental management is crucial. Ample
evidence of the failure to do so is found in Russia and in cases of international aid (Roe,
1994; Darst, 2001).
This introductory chapter is based on the outline in Figure 1. I begin by giving an outlook
of the relevant parts of governance and management literature as they apply to the
research question. I then proceed to describe recent changes in environmental governance
in Russia, together with an account of environmental strategy before and after these
changes (Figure 1). The four journal articles following the introductory chapter reveal a
broader picture of the case study, and will in part open the analysis towards directions
that transcend the main research question of the dissertation.
2. Environmental Strategy and Policy
This dissertation is first and foremost about the boundary between corporate
environmental strategy and public environmental policy. The outline in Figure 1 is
composed of generalizations for phenomena that I have observed in the empirical study
of the mining industry in the Kola Peninsula. But while the outline emerges from the
empirical material, its contents resonate well with the literature on environmental
management and governance. The fragmentation of power over environmental protection,
which has taken place in the case region, is familiar from governance studies in the
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European context (Rhodes, 1996). New challenges have also arisen in the legitimation of
the mining activities in the Kola Peninsula: the mining companies now need to pay more
attention to international non-governmental organizations (NGO) and actors on the global
market. Similar issues in the legitimacy of environmental management have been
observed in the mining industry in general (Warhurst and Mitchell, 2000; Humphreys,
2001; Peck and Sinding, 2003).
In addition to the methodology and theories used in the articles for this dissertation, there
is a more general phenomenon that I feel compelled to describe: the emergent properties
of environmental governance. In short, the processes behind environmental governance
are tied to a specific context and community. This means that it appears impossible for
scholars and policymakers alike to develop any general criteria for the governance
process (Meadowcroft, 2002; Haila and Dyke, 2006). Yet, the real-life actors negotiating
environmental governance do arrive at closure over the conditions for environmental
strategy and policy. It is likely, therefore, that the governance process exhibits a number
of emergent properties. While the search for specific criteria for environmental
governance appears fruitless, the dynamics of these emergent properties bear promise for
a better understanding of governance (Meadowcroft, 2002; Haila and Dyke, 2006).
Two theoretical concepts find support from the empirical work done in this dissertation:
strategic fit and policy networks. Both of these concepts have been used in a broad
variety of research orientations. In strategic fit, the spectrum spans from business policy
to organization theory (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). Policy networks, in turn, have
generally been viewed either as typologies of interest intermediation or as a form of
governance alternative to hierarchies and the market (Börzel, 1998). The most relevant
orientations within these theories are those with a process view of strategy and policy,
which, thus, allow for the study of the emergent properties of environmental governance.
Before proceeding to the empirical findings of the case study, I will briefly introduce the
two theoretical concepts.
2.1. Business Organizations and their Strategic Fit
The relationship between the business organization and its operational environment (as a
distinction from the natural environment) has been in the focus of extensive research for
decades. Depending on how the operational environment is defined, a distinction is made
between rationalistic, evolutionary, and constructivist approaches (Scott, 1981; Hatch,
1997). In the rationalistic approach, an organization is perceived to interact with its
environment through the acquisition of resources. At the same time, the available
resources (labour, capital, raw materials, technology) constrain the activities of the
organization. The evolutionary approach, in turn, emphasizes the ways in which the
organization shapes and is shaped by its environment. The organization may be seen
through the population ecology metaphor, in that survival in competition against other
organizations and the environment becomes a defining factor. Finally, the constructivist
approach emphasizes the ways in which the members of the organization make sense of
and give meaning to the relationship between the organization and its environment.
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Regardless of the approach, however, it is understood that an organization passes
information and material to and from its environment. Sometimes the actors within
organizations are unaware of this exchange but, typically, they attempt to intentionally
steer it. In this steering activity, organizational strategy is a pivotal tool.
Institutional theory argues, that, while economic resources are critical to the operation of
industrial companies, they should not forget the importance of maintaining social
legitimacy: if an organization violates the expectations of its social environment, the
environment may invalidate the organization (North, 1990; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991;
Hatch, 1997; Scott, 2001). Therefore, it should be of interest to corporate managers and
strategists to pay attention to how their organization performs in relation to its operational
environment.
Corporate environmental strategies are frameworks that guide the organization’s practices
in the context of the natural environment. Depending on the strategy, the practices may or
may not include a dialogue with the society’s requirements for a “good environment”.
Environmental management literature typically defines strategy in terms of the type of
engagement that a corporation has with the natural environment and stakeholders. The
level of engagement, in turn, is influenced both by the risk of environmental harm from
the actions of the company, and by its environmental business opportunities (Welford,
1998). Business opportunities, however, are typically not fixed or readily observable. It is
surely up to an individual company to create them, to see an opportunity where its
competitors do not. It is thus contingent upon a company’s entrepreneurial stance and
psychological state, not its industrial activity per se, whether it perceives and exploits
business opportunities.
What is more, understanding business opportunities as fixed and readily observable
ignores the actual formation of the governance processes that both shape and are shaped
by corporate strategy. An organization theory view on strategic fit gives a more nuanced
picture. In this view, strategy has been seen as a way for the organization to steer its
internal structure and processes, to influence the structures and processes of the
operational environment, or both (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). Drawing from a
population ecology metaphor, the concept of fit has been used to describe a number of
ways by which the members of an organization formulate and implement strategy
(Chandler, 1962; Miller, 1988). In simple terms, by achieving a fit between strategy and
its context—be it internal or external—an organization is expected to perform better
(Venkatraman and Prescott, 1990). Additionally, strategic fit has been found to be
inherently dynamic. That is, companies that are able to maintain a sufficient level of
change between organizational resources and environmental forces are successful while
those changing too slowly or too fast experience negative performance consequences
(Zajac and Kraatz, 2000). Another distinction is found between the content and process of
fit (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). The content of fit is emphasized by the design
school of strategy and involves aligning strategy with the organization’s internal and
external elements. This view of strategy has faced criticism due to its deterministic
undertone, which aims at the separation of strategy formulation from strategy
implementation (Mintzberg, 1990). The network school, emphasizing the processes of
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arriving at fit—the gestalt of fit—requires analysis on networks of organizations with
interdependent strategies (Venkatraman and Camillus, 1984). It therefore touches closely
upon the emergent properties of governance and (as will become clear below) coincides
with the process view of policy networks.
The case study in sections 4 and 5 deals with the patterns of interaction in a network of
organizations and sometimes actors, rather than with the content of fit as such. What is
still lacking from this picture is the formation of environmental policy that sets the
boundaries for corporate activities, and the ways in which corporations take part in
policymaking. The concept of the policy network helps us to further conceptualize
strategic fit.
2.2. Governance and Policy Networks
Governance has been typically understood as how the society is “steered” (Rhodes, 1996;
Stoker, 1998). The steering is conducted by various actor groups and networks in society,
including the central government. More precisely, governance is about the distribution of
decision-making power between the state and other actor groups in the society, such as
supranational governments, local governments, private businesses and non-governmental
organizations. Historically, governance has been defined as a process with two stages:
first, in the post Second World War Europe, nation states gained foothold as dominant
political decision-makers. Second, by the 1990s, many European nation states had to a
significant degree lost or given up their decision-making power. In processes of
Europeanization and globalization, governance appeared in the form of privatized public
services and the strengthening of supranational structures such as the EU and the EMU
(Pierre and Peters, 2000). Typical governance processes are the expansion of
constituencies (EU, NGO), decentralization of policymaking (local governments, NGO),
or privatization of goods and services production (Pierre and Peters, 2000). In
environmental governance, environmental policy instruments (indicators, incentives,
scenarios, standards) are defined by voluntary agreements and market-based mechanisms
as well as government command and control (Jordan, Wurzel et al., 2005).
Against this historical background, governance presents itself as a continuum in which at
one end there is strong state government (e.g. Europe in the 1940s - 1970s) and at the
other end there is strong distributed governance (e.g. Europe in 2008 or sometime in the
future). At the state government end, then, one would find environmental policy
instruments based on command and control, while at the distributed governance end, the
dominant instruments are those based on voluntary agreements between different
groupings in society. Although compelling, this view does not give much support to the
task laid out earlier for this dissertation: to shed light on the emergent rather than
predetermined governance processes.
In Russia, state governance structures are being partly replaced by non-state governance
structures. Research on Russian corporate governance has been conducted (Kosonen,
2002) but here, too, governance converges to a traditional resource-dependence view of
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the organization. A good example of governance research in a transition-economic setting
is a recent number of Environmental Politics, which assesses environmental governance
in China mainly from the perspective of ecological modernization (Mol and Carter,
2006).
One general argument for studying environmental governance in Russia is that the state
has an important role to play in governing, but to be able to retain its power it needs to be
able to adapt to the emerging alternative decision-making configurations, and it needs to
be able to allocate its decision-making power to those configurations (Pierre and Peters,
2000). It follows that the state needs to maintain several scenarios and future
configurations consisting of economic, political, social, technical and environmental
factors, while it at the same time needs to maintain the credibility of its actions. The case
study conducted in this dissertation reinforces in a rare context the argument that there is
a discrepancy between changes in legal and constitutional frameworks and actual political
and institutional behaviour. This discrepancy, so the argument goes, cannot be sustained
for a long period of time (North, 1990; Pierre and Peters, 2000, pp. 17). Legal and
constitutional frameworks should “catch up” with actual behaviour but since the changes
in the latter have been spontaneous and organic, it is difficult to harness the change in the
formal frameworks.
To analyze the interplay between strategy and policy, I use the concept of policy network.
The new governance literature considers the policy network as a new mode of public
management in sectors where the government alone cannot act effectively (Dowding
1995; Börzel 1998; Evans and Davies 1999; Marsh and Smith 2000). Policy networks
usually display a predominance of informal, decentralized and horizontal relations (Kenis
and Schneider, 1991: 32). In addition, policy networks can be considered as inter-
organizational modes of interaction through which distinct organizational entities—
groups with their own structures, functions and goals—come into contact. Network
interactions are characterized by trust and cooperation (see Rhodes, 1996), but also
hierarchy and conflict (Meadowcroft, 1997: 440). Patterns of network interaction are
shaped by governments, and by legal and institutional frameworks.
Most policy network models tend to be better at explaining stability, i.e., demonstrating
similarities across nations or sectors where different formal institutional processes exist,
than at explaining policy change or fundamental political processes (Dowding, 1995).
Taking the process dimension seriously means that “policy networks should be viewed as
part of the broader social world and are always in a state of becoming. They are not fixed
and determinate entities. Their major features—power dependency, goals, dominant
coalitions and appreciative systems, processes of exchange, rules of the game, and so
on—are the outcroppings of the process of social construction” (Evans, 2001). The
following analysis does not support policy networks as rational forms of organization,
but, rather, gives reasons to see them as products of an ongoing process of social and
political construction which is intertwined with broader systems of governance in
complex ways (Kingdon, 1984; Marsh and Olsen, 1984, cited in Evans 2001: 546).
Accordingly, in the following analysis, I will identify a number of policy networks and
investigate the processes through which these policy networks are produced and
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reproduced. In this dissertation, policy networks are found in the context of some specific
environmental problem or technological model. The interests and ideas of people and
their power to produce and maintain a network formation are central as they form the
mechanisms that maintain and reproduce the established network form and define the
capacity to control the direction of policy (Evans, 2001: 545-547).
As the regulation and planning of human-environment interaction is primarily based on
scientific knowledge of the environment, indicators, models and standards continue to
play an important role in environmental governance and, consequently, in policy
networks (Hezri and Dovers, 2006). Moreover, as will become clearer in the following
pages, the changes in the structures of environmental governance induce changes in
corporate environmental strategy as well.
3. Material and methods
The case study area of this dissertation, the Russian Kola Peninsula, is located south of
the Arctic Ocean, north of the Arctic Circle, and east of Finland and Norway (Figure 2).
It is an area of immense natural resources, of which mainly minerals have been extracted
since the 1930s. As a result of this extraction, several sites in the Western parts of the
peninsula were brought to an ecological disaster by the 1960s. Consequently, the Russian
government imposed pollution restrictions on the mining industries in the 1970s. Along
with the Soviet politics of détente at the end of the 1980s the considerable environmental
degradation of the Kola Peninsula was revealed to the rest of the world. In the early
1990s, then, the Russian government significantly increased its focus on environmental
issues and tightened its environmental policy on several government levels (Darst, 2001;
Oldfield, 2005). On the Kola Peninsula, this coincided with increased Western attention
on the environmental impact of the mining industries and the Arctic nuclear fleet. Since
the late 1990s, however, the Russian government and the president have consistently
reduced their interventions in environmental issues and industrial pollution. At the same
time, mining companies in Russia have adopted standardized international EMS, mostly
due to pressure from the international market on which these companies operate today.
The ecological consequences of emissions of heavy metals, sulphur dioxide and
phosphates in the Kola Peninsula have been in the focus of a numerous Russian and
international scientific studies for the past 15 years (for good overviews, see e.g. Kozlov
and Barcan, 2000; Hønneland and Jørgensen, 2003). Yet, research on possibilities for
ecological restructuring of the predominant polluter of the region—the mining industry—
has been sparse. Even though the industrial infrastructure of the region continues to have
a significant impact on the economic and ecological development of the entire European
North, there is little knowledge on the history and present situation of environmental and
natural resource management practices in the Kola Peninsula. Ambitious scenario work
on the Barents region as a whole has been conducted recently (Brunstad, Eivind et al.,
2004), but these studies tend to be on too general a level to address the specific solutions
on human-environmental interaction that have been implemented in the region’s mining
industries during the past two decades.
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Figure 2. The case region with its six mining locations and the region’s capital Murmansk.
The analysis in this thesis is based on both qualitative and quantitative data. The
qualitative material consists of 52 thematic interviews with relevant stakeholders in the
Kola Peninsula including mining experts from the Kola Science Centre (KSC), managers
from the four major mining companies of the region—Kola Mining and Metallurgical
Company (KMMC), JSC Apatit, Kovdor GOK and Olenegorsk GOK—directors from
regional and local administration, and key individuals in local environmental Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGO) (Table 2). Three rounds of interviews were held, in
2002, 2003, and 2004, and conducted either in English or with the help of an English–
Russian translator. The interviewees were chosen with the snowball sampling
methodology in which each interviewee was asked to give the names of additional people
to be interviewed on the environmental situation in the Kola Peninsula. In addition, the
qualitative material consists of over 100 documents written by the relevant stakeholders.
These documents include publications in Russian and international scientific journals and
proceedings, reports from the KSC, monographs by mining experts and annual reports of
the mining companies. The quantitative material consists of production and pollution data
collected from the four major mining companies in the Kola Peninsula, and from the
regional authorities.
Kola Peninsula
FINLAND
NORWAY
Barents Sea
ARCTIC CIRCLE
Lake
Imandra
Apatity
Monchegorsk
Olenegorsk
Kovdor
Murmansk
Nikel
Zaplolyarnyj
   1 : 6 000 000
60 km
REPUBLIC OF
KARELIA
R U S S I A
White Sea
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Table 2. Qualitative data sources used in this dissertation. The 1st hand oral accounts (number of
interviews in parentheses) are recollections of the interviewees’ personal experiences or their
opinions. The 2nd hand oral accounts are the interviewees’ opinions about issues they have not
personally experienced.
Oral Written
KSC (25), industry (18), regional
government (2), NGOs (4), local
government (3) (1st and 2nd hand oral
accounts)
Scientific and newspaper articles by KSC, regional
government, mining industry, General Secretary/President
Gorbachev, Russian Academy of Sciences
The research data provided grounds for four different historical and interpretive
narratives, as presented in the four journal articles following this introduction. These
narratives explain how human actions have affected the environment and how this has
been conditioned by institutions in the case study region. This introductory chapter, too,
provides a “meta narrative” that builds on those constructed in the articles. In
constructing the narratives, my co-authors and I have used counterfactual modelling,
legitimacy analysis, cultural analysis and frame analysis. I will briefly introduce each
method of analysis.
The first method of analysis is quantitative and differs therefore from the three qualitative
ones described below. Counterfactual analysis estimates the present effects of
hypothetical changes in a system’s history. It is a method typically used in cognitive and
social psychology (see Roese and Olson, 1995), but also in scenario work (Baas, 1998;
Begg, Jackson et al., 2001). In the Kola Peninsula case study, I modelled the expected
environmental and economic consequences of operationalising complex utilization (one
of the key long term environmental strategies in the region). I then compared it with the
actual production and emission data from the mining industry. Used this way, the
counterfactual method does not allow direct comparison between the modelled and actual
developments. Rather, in relation to each other, the modelled and the actual outcomes
behave like scenarios in the sense that they are two possible development paths out of
many more (Bruun, Hukkinen et al., 2002). In this way, the counterfactual analysis
provides a “quantitative” narrative for this dissertation.
The second methodology I have used in this dissertation assesses the legitimacy and
institutional isomorphism in the mining industry. In short, legitimacy is a ‘‘generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate
within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’’
(Suchman, 1995: 574). For the purposes of the dissertation, legitimacy offers a useful
way of expressing the drivers behind environmental strategy in corporations. In their
attempt to achieve legitimacy and comprehensibility, organizations may resort to mimetic
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Suchman, 1995). Along with the two other
types of institutional isomorphism—coercive and normative isomorphism—mimetic
isomorphism may guide the decision of an organization to apply a system of
environmental and social responsibility standards. In particular, mimetic isomorphism is
understood as the tendency of business organizations to mimic the behaviour of other
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similar actors in the field in order to reduce uncertainty. Coercive isomorphism, in turn, is
understood as the tendency of business organizations to behave homogenously in order to
avoid sanctions, for example by regularly complying with environmental emission norms.
Finally, normative isomorphism is related to the change in values and norms of an
organization, in this context of following an environmental standard or agreement
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).
Third, the cultural analysis utilizes the cultural theory framework (Douglas, 1982),
storylines (Hajer, 1995), and indicator theory. The cultural theory framework expresses
five different cultural biases relative to two dimensions: group and grid. Group delineates
how sharply the members of a community are separated from those who do not belong to
it. In terms of environmental and natural resource management this boils down to use
rights: Who has the right to exploit a given natural resource or pollute the environment?
Grid measures the strength of “visible rules about space and time related to social roles’’
(Douglas, 1982). In other words, grid is a measure of how tightly society controls its
members’ ways of exploiting natural resources and polluting the environment. Different
combinations of weak and strong grid/group yield five cultural biases: egalitarian,
hierarchic, individualistic, fatalistic and hermit (Douglas, 1982). Each of these biases is
given specific characteristics that allow for each social structure to be present in at least
one of the five biases at all times. Storylines, in turn, are narratives with a beginning,
middle and end. They describe the social reality by combining elements from many
different domains. They provide actors on a policy issue with symbolic references that
suggest a common understanding. As such, they are essential political devices that allow
actors to overcome fragmentation and achieve discursive closure (Hajer, 1995).
Notably, cultural theory has been criticized for its inability to explain differences in inter-
individual perception of risk (Sjöberg, 1998). Whether the same applies for the
perception of nature, further research is warranted. This dissertation, however, aims not at
explaining inter-individual difference. Rather, it analyses how specific actor groups
choose human-environment indicators under some general perception of the environment.
The analysis draws from the extensive research by Mary Douglas in cultural
anthropology. As Douglas is careful to note, however, all cultural biases are likely to
appear in any given culture at any given time. Even the individual can exhibit a number
of different cultural types and switch smoothly from one type to another. Douglas’
overall point, which is furthered by the research of Thompson (1990) and Schwarz and
Thompson (1990), is that in communities some cultural types dominate others. Thus, at
any given time, a society is composed of a number of different communities that are
guided by a dominant way of life (although other views may exist within the community).
The importance of storylines to this dissertation, in turn, lies in that they not only enrich
the cultural theory framework, but also help us understand the context-specificity and
path dependence of human-environment indicators. Indicators are repeated observations
and measurements of the economy, human well-being, and impacts of human activities
on the natural world. In sustainability policy, their purpose is to “sound alarms, define
challenges, and measure progress” (National Research Council, 1999: 233-4). Storylines
act as interpretive frameworks for indicators in two ways. First, they justify the existence
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of individual indicators and thus guide the choice of relevant indicators with which to
measure a particular phenomenon. Indicators relevant to sustainability storyline A, for
example, may differ from those relevant to sustainability storyline B. Second, storylines
provide benchmarks for assessing the significance of specific indicator values and thus
guide the setting of a permissible range within which the value of a particular indicator
may vary. In the earlier example, even if sustainability storylines A and B share an
indicator, the permissible range of variation in the value of the indicator differs from A to
B (van Eeten and Roe, 2002; Hukkinen, 2003). What is more, the dimensions of the
cultural theory framework, group and grid, correspond conceptually with indicator
systems. The choice of relevant indicators is an important part of the self-definition
process by which a community separates those who belong to it from those who do not
(the group dimension); and the determination of permissible value ranges for indicators is
a key aspect of rule-setting by the community (the grid dimension).
Finally, the fourth method, frame analysis, addresses the construction of reality and
meaning in sense-making and communication processes (Fisher, 1997; Benford and
Snow, 2000). Frames can be understood as interpretative schemes that people use in order
to make sense of the world (Fisher, 1997). Framing an event or issue in a certain way
highlights selected aspects, thus constructing meaning and suggesting guidelines for
action. In other words, frames define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments,
and suggest remedies (Entman, 1993). The potential communicative success of a given
frame depends on how well it resonates with the audience or recipient that is to be
mobilized behind the framed idea. Better resonance, in turn, can be sought through frame
alignment, which implies strategically designing frames to invigorate existing values or
narratives, to encompass concerns of potential adherents, or to change the prevailing
understanding of a particular issue (Snow, Rochford et al., 1986; Benford and Snow,
2000). In our frame analysis, the interview transcriptions and documents were screened
for arguments as to why a specific environmental strategy in the Kola Peninsula is of
importance (Article 4).
The qualitative methods help me describe how policy networks are maintained and
reproduced for strategic fit. The quantitative methodology, in turn, helps me describe
(partly) the environmental impacts of a given strategy, i.e. to find out if an environmental
strategy in fact delivers the expected outcomes during implementation.
4. Environmental Strategy and Governance in the Kola Peninsula
In this section, I open up and explain the schematic presented in Figure 1. I illustrate how,
during the past 20 years, environmental strategies, indicators and the style of co-operation
have co-evolved with environmental governance in the Kola Peninsula. Two shifts in
environmental governance can be identified: privatization and re-centralization (Figure
1). The first one, treated in the following subsections, is a well-known shift in the very
social order of Russia. The second one looks into the near future and illustrates
environmental strategy under two alternative governance outcomes: one in which state
governance structures once again replace the non-state governance structures, and the
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other in which state governance structures continue to be replaced by the non-state ones. I
take a closer look at these future trends in section 6.
In subsection 4.1, I begin the story by introducing the first governance shift in Figure 1:
privatization. Before and after the governance shifts, those deciding over and
implementing the mineral resource use and environmental protection in the Kola
Peninsula have needed to rethink their strategies and policies. In the dissertation, this
network of actors has been defined in two closely related ways. The Kola mining network
(Article 3) refers to an ecological epistemic community: its members hold similar beliefs
about the need to preserve environmental quality and similar views on the origins of
pollution, the policies necessary to control pollution, and the research needed to
determine the physical linkages between sources of pollution and ecosystem health
(Haas, 1989; Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 1997; Jamison, 2001). Accordingly, the members of
the Kola mining network emphasize the need to preserve environmental quality through a
technological system that will achieve both environmental and economic benefits; they
share an expert view of the sources of pollution from the mining industry; they emphasize
the government’s role in establishing the desired technological system; and many of them
are practicing research on the effects of industrial pollution on ecosystems.
The CU’s proponents (Article 4), in turn, are political, scientific and industrial actors who
have simply taken part in the promotion of complex utilization throughout the industrial
history of the Kola Peninsula. The distinction between these two is minor but relevant:
while the CU’s proponents were defined strictly in relation to complex utilization, the
Kola mining network contains individuals that have promoted alternative ways of
resource use as well. Given that this introductory essay addresses environmental
strategies beyond complex utilization, I will in the following use the broader term, the
Kola mining network.
4.1. Environmental Policy in Russia: The Path into the 2000s
Although the significant negative environmental impacts of the Soviet industry
throughout the 1900s would seem to suggest otherwise, environmental protection was
never absent from the Soviet politics. Strict nature reserves (zapovedniki) established in
the early 1900s were considered a proper means of protecting nature from the dominant
threat – resource extraction (Article 3; Weiner, 1999). In retrospect, of course, it is easy
to see how this way of protecting the environment in small separate entities was a
strategy doomed to fail. Stronger environmental policies were to follow. In the 1971 –
1975 five year plan, the Soviet economic growth was to be based on maximized
utilization of mineral resources and the general growth of the heavy industry (Strishkov,
1971). Accordingly, the 1972 Supreme Soviet decree “Concerning Measures for the
Further Improvement of Nature Protection and the Rational Utilization of Natural
Resources” outlined a holistic environmental policy. Previously, environmental policy
was implemented by a number of ministries and state committees (Oldfield, 2005). The
increasing importance of environmental policy was visible in the fourth Soviet
constitution of 1977, which explicitly conditioned economic growth with environmental
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well-being. In addition, following the 1972 decree, environmental legislation was
developed and initiated in four sections covering water, minerals, forests, and air quality.
To an important degree, this division of environmental policy domains is replicated in the
current Ministry of Natural Resources.
The 1980s saw a heightened level of enthusiasm in the environmental East-West co-
operation. A lot of the credit for this enthusiasm goes to Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms
from the mid-1980s on but already in the 1970s Leonid Brezhnev’s regime had used
international environmental policy as a key element of détente. In fact, Brezhnev’s
contribution to the agreement on the LRTAP in 1979 has been assessed as crucial for the
treaty (Darst, 2001). This point may be significant in understanding the Soviet
involvement in international environmental policy. The LRTAP, however, had little
actual effect on the emissions of the industries like the cupro-nickel smelters of the Kola
Peninsula—not until the 2000s, that is. Nevertheless, the “greening” of the Soviet foreign
policy continued during the Gorbachev era. This meant that environment was used as a
pretext to get Western funding for economic restructuring. As will become clear in
subsection 4.2, the significance of the “greening” lies in the ways in which it shaped the
environmental strategies of Russian industries.
In the early 1990s the profile of environmental policy was further enhanced as the
Russian government in 1991 upgraded the previous State Committee of Environmental
Protection and Natural Resources to become the Ministry of the Environment, and issued
the law “Concerning the Protection of the Natural Environment” (Kotov and Nikitina,
1993; Oldfield, 2005). Two important elements were introduced in these changes. First,
the law imposed strict restrictions on pollution, which were enforced with a command-
and-control based pollution charge system. That is, industrial companies became liable
for paying a certain per-ton base rate for emissions of pollutants listed in the law up to
given emission limits and a five-fold rate for emissions exceeding the limits. Second, in
conjunction with the upgrading of the environmental committee into a ministry, a number
of environmental funds were established on regional and federal levels. As decentralized
units of environmental regulation, these funds had the task of allocating money to
environmental projects. The funds were financed by the revenue from the pollution
charges, from which 90% was directed to the fund and 10% to the federal budget (OECD,
2004).
During the remaining part of the 1990s, however, the Russian presidents continually
reduced the position of environmental agencies in the Russian political hierarchy. In
1993, the newly established ministry lost its jurisdiction over a number of key industries,
such as the atomic industry and minerals export. In 1996, the ministry was reassigned the
status of a State Committee, with many of its previous tasks now coordinated by the
Ministry of Natural Resources.
In 2000, President Putin eliminated the State Environmental Committee and the regional
environmental funds, and redistributed the tasks of environmental protection to the
Ministry of Natural Resources. The rationale for this change was officially stated as an
interest in better allocation of implementation responsibilities between federal, regional
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and local administrative bodies. What little economic decision-making power was
previously given to the regional environmental funds was now returned back to the
central government. As a result of the reorganisation, 90 percent of the federal staff and
equipment were transferred to regional administration and most of the responsibility was
devolved to the regional governments. However, these changes did not result in budget
increases to the regional administration and remained institutionally rather ambiguous,
creating confusion with regard to responsibility for compliance and enforcement. There is
thus some doubt that these changes were motivated by a desire to downscale
environmental policymaking as a whole in the country, rather than by a systematic
administrative reform program. According to a study conducted by the World Bank in
2004, more progressive and economically viable regions and cities scrambled to make up
some of the shortfalls, while most regions did not make it (World Bank, 2004).
It is fairly difficult to distil a clear pattern of power shifts between the federal and the
regional authorities in Russian environmental governance from the early 1990s on.
Although the Ministry of the Environment was retained in the administrative structure of
the Russian Federation, the late 1980s—early 1990s centralization of environmental
management did not have long lasting effects. Apparently some power was leveraged to
the regions, but this too may have had adversary impacts on the environment. This is
evident in the Kola Peninsula where regional actors were allowed to deal with the
environment at will, while at the same time they were competing for control over the
region’s natural resources. In the absence of well-functioning property rights and a
corresponding judicial system, privatization led rapidly to a situation where the managers
of extractive industries in particular were able to exploit the environment and natural
resources regardless of what the society may have considered desirable. At the same time,
decentralization of government allocated significant power to regional political leaders.
Combined with the Soviet tradition of industrial managers and political leaders forming
strong regional elites, decentralization allowed the regions to act free of the control of
federal government (Kotov and Nikitina, 1996). Rather than investing into the future of
the regions, however, the elites typically exploited the regional revenue for their own
benefit.
The Soviet system of environmental governance included key targets that are analogous
to the aims of sustainable development as defined in the Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development of 1992 (Oldfield, 2005). Yet, the reorganization of the entire Russian
political-economic system required the system of environmental governance to be
reorganized as well. The result was not a system of coherent environmental policies but,
rather, fragmented governance that takes many forms. It is therefore reasonable to look at
individual cases of environmental strategy and policy. In the following section, I will take
a closer look at the strategies, indicators and modes of co-operation of the Kola Peninsula
mining industry during the privatization period.
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4.2. Environmental Strategy: From Complex Utilization to Environmental
Management Systems
A key environmental strategy in the Kola Peninsula mining industry in the late 1980s was
complex utilization, which focused on the systemic increase of production volume and
the reduction of environmental impacts. This was to be implemented with large scale
production models for regional inter-industrial waste re-use. Complex utilization had
been under development in the Kola Peninsula since the late 1920s, and it reached
maturity and partial implementation in the late 1980s. The production model was to solve
the environmental problems caused by gaseous sulphur dioxide emissions and deposited
nepheline tailings by feeding these wastes back into the production system (Luzin,
Peshev et al., 1988). The priority of complex utilization over other environmental
strategies was highlighted in the Presidential decree from Mikhail Gorbachev:
“In a number of districts ecological situation is unfavourable. The ministries of
ferrous metallurgy, nonferrous metallurgy, fertilizers, building materials did not
follow the governmental decisions on deepening processing of the extracted materials,
wider application of modern resource saving and ecologically clean technologies.’’
(Gorbachev and Ryzhkov, 1988, pp. 1)
With “deepening” of extraction, Gorbachev and Ryzhkov referred to the utilization of
waste materials and the creation of new products. All mining and construction companies
in the Kola Peninsula would take part in this enormous top-down steered recycling
system. The waste feedback would require new processes that would add value to the
region’s products and broaden the product mix. The main mass flows of the existing
mining companies in the Kola Peninsula are given in Table 3. In addition, Table 3
presents a range of novel products that were planned to be obtained with complex
utilization.
Overall, the plan for complex utilization was well in line with the general Soviet
environmental and natural resources policy of the 1980s. First, it provided a practical way
of reducing the negative environmental impacts of mining in the Kola Peninsula while
increasing the amount of valuable mineral products. Second, it enhanced the freedom of
economic activity in Russia by allowing the industry to export its production surplus. The
latter was a central aspect of Gorbachev’s economic restructuring. Suffice it to say
complex utilization—had it been implemented in full scale—would certainly have
increased the region’s industrial output and reduced the per-product level of pollution. It
is likely, however, that the absolute pollution levels in the Kola Peninsula would on some
occasions have increased (Article 1). In addition, the environmental and technological
risks related to the introduction of new process elements became pressing in the late
1980s when the incentive for complex utilization was at its highest (Article 3).
It appears that both environmental concerns and economic opportunities were behind the
implementation of complex utilization. Environmental issues surfaced in the Soviet
Union in the 1970s and 1980s in the wake of the Chernobyl accident and the Aral Sea
eco-catastrophe (Graham, 1998).
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Table 3. Main mass flows of the five case companies, and the hypothetical Kola Chemical Plant,
obtained from Article 1. Bauxite is the main market substitute for nepheline concentrate. Organic
fertilizers are the main substitutes for apatite concentrate, super phosphate and fused potassium
magnesium fertilizers (FPMF).
Complex utilization Actual development
Supplier / consumer
within the Kola Peninsula
Supplier / consumer outside
the Kola Peninsula
Supplier /
consumer
within the Kola
Peninsula
Supplier / consumer
outside the Kola
Peninsula
Supplies: Iron pellets, sodium salts,
sulphuric acid
Copper, nickel, cobalt,
sulphuric acid
Sulphuric acid Copper, nickel, cobalt,
sulphuric acid
Severonikel
Consumes: Virgin ore, Cu-Ni matte,
iron filtrate, calcinated
soda, Portland cement
Cu-Ni matte Cu-Ni matte Cu-Ni matte
Supplies: Cu-Ni matte, sulphuric
acid, commodity slag
Cu-Ni matte,
sulphuric acid
Cu-Ni matte, sulphuric
acid
Pechenganikel
Consumes: Cu-Ni ore, silicates,
Portland cement
Cu-Ni ore Cu-Ni ore Cu-Ni ore
Supplies: Nepheline concentrate,
iron filtrate
Apatite concentrate, nepheline
concentrate, sphene,
titanomagnetite, Al-
coagulants, Na-K-Ca-saltpetre,
Amorphous silicates, P-K
fertilizers
Sphene,
titanomagnetite,
Al-coagulants
Apatite concentrate,
nepheline concentrate,
aegirine
Apatit
Consumes: Virgin ore, sulphuric acid,
Portland cement
Flotation reagents Virgin ore,
sulphuric acid
Flotation reagents
Supplies: Calcium carbonate, iron
filtrate
Iron ore concentrate, apatite
concentrate, baddeleyite
concentrate, super phosphate,
FPMF
Iron ore concentrate,
apatite concentrate,
baddeleyite concentrate
Kovdor
(with super
phosphate
and FPMF
plants) Consumes: Virgin ore, tailings,
calcinated soda, silicates,
sulphuric acid, Portland
cement
Virgin ore,
tailings
Supplies:  Silicates, iron filtrate,
gravel, sand
Iron ore concentrate, iron ore
super concentrate, gravel, sand
Gravel Iron ore concentrate,
gravel
Olenegorsk
Consumes: Virgin ore, Portland
cement
Virgin ore
Supplies: Alumina, Portland cement,
calcinated soda, potassium
silicate
P-K fertilizers, potash,
saltpetre
Kola
Chemical
Plant
Consumes: Nepheline, calcium
carbonate, commodity
slag,
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To finance the clean-up of industries and many polluted areas, the Soviet government
sought money from foreign governments through various co-operation treaties. Some of
these treaties, it has been claimed, were set up entirely for financial opportunities and
little was done for actual environmental protection (Darst, 2001). Complex Utilization
shows both sides of the story. On one hand, the Degree issued by President Gorbachev
for the implementation of complex utilization highlights the unacceptably poor state of
the ecosystems in the Kola Peninsula and gives detailed procedures for remedy. On the
other hand, complex utilization meant a significant increase in the output of industrial
products from the region. The Pechenganikel co-operation project, for instance, was
marketed to the West as an environmental project but domestically, the project was
justified by the potential for increasing production capacity (Article 3).
The implementation of complex utilization came to a full stop at the downfall of the
Soviet Union in 1991. In spite of this, the concept has remained as a potential future
strategy among those promoted by the Kola Mining community. The concept is strikingly
similar to the principles and technologies of sustainable development, which perhaps
explains its persistence.
Although complex utilization remains a viable option in parts of the Kola Mining
network, its implementation continues to face considerable obstacles. After privatization,
and throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the mining industry has decreasingly been
steered by the state. A holistic production and environmental strategy is therefore not
perceived as feasible by the industrial actors. As the state has given up its steering of
environmental management as well, a new trend among the mining companies has
emerged: they have been active in adopting international EMS. The mining companies, in
short, strive for good environmental profile in the international commodities market. The
main driver for these systems has been “market pressure”, i.e. the demand from the global
commodities market for environmentally friendly raw materials (Article 2).
It is obvious that the environment has become such an important legitimacy issue to the
mining companies that they need to do more than just comply with pollution permits and
other (ineffective) government regulation. In doing so, the companies not only view other
market actors as sources of legitimacy. Legitimacy is also involved in drivers such as
stakeholder and regulatory pressure, organizational culture and learning, and the
influence of individuals (Article 2). As environmental management by the state is deemed
insufficient by a number of actors granting legitimacy to the mining operations, much of
the future environmental state of the peninsula depends on the voluntary EMS. Due to the
recent past of the industries in the Kola Peninsula as “town-forming enterprises”,
however, much of their social role still remains. Community responsibility is frequently
present in the articulations of corporate executives on environmental issues.
The development and adoption of both complex utilization and the EMS are constrained
and accompanied by a number of factors. In the following two subsections, I will further
describe two such factors (see Figure 1): environmental indicators and models of co-
operation.
33
4.3. Environmental Indicators: From Eco-efficiency to Profitability
The Kola mining network has relied on a number of indicators measuring human-
environment interaction during the past 75 years. In the 1930s, when large-scale
utilization of the mineral resources in the region began, the prevailing strategy was to
separate nature from the industry in nature reserves (Article 3). From the mining
community’s point of view it was fully acceptable to exploit the ecosystems in and
around the mining sites to a point of collapse. This strategy required the use of production
indicators for maximizing the exploitation of natural resources on one hand and
indicators for the protection of key ecosystem functions in secluded nature reserves on
the other. At the same time, however, the community faced the tremendous task of
overcoming the harsh natural conditions of the arctic in setting up and later expanding the
mining activities.
The Soviet system aimed at complete control through inherent orderliness, which was to
be reached with the control figures of the five-year plans. In the terminology of cultural
theory, this way of measuring human-environment interaction reflected a hierarchic
storyline. Strong group cohesion allowed for a clear-cut choice of indicators that further
separated those who had the right to exploit natural resources from those who did not.
The distinction between “intact nature” and “resource pool”, for instance, completely
isolated the ethnic Sámi population from the resource use scheme (Sarv, 1996). Strong
grid, in turn, allotted an undisputed authority to those high in the hierarchy to define the
permissible range of variation in the key indicators. In the “resource pool”, extraction
activities were taken to the extreme (with well-known environmental consequences). The
nature reserves, representing the “intact nature”, were protected from any use including
the traditional semi-domesticated reindeer herding by the Sámi.
In the 1980s, the strategy of complex utilization contradicted the previously held idea of
separating nature from industry, but rather, it emphasized a simultaneous reduction of the
negative environmental impacts and a boost in the economic performance of all the
industrial sectors of the Kola Peninsula. The key indicator in this strategy measured the
mass and value of new products, such as Portland cement, that were produced from
wastes that were previously emitted into the ground or the atmosphere. These indicators,
therefore, were an indirect measure of the human impact on the environment.
The production system based on complex utilization had one aspect that raised concern
among the decision makers in the Kola Peninsula: although the system would reduce the
amount of conventional pollutants, it was possible that the complex system would begin
to emit novel pollutants into the environment. Precaution with novel pollutants was
therefore recommended as a key element in environmental and natural resources
management. In addition, the amount of technogenic earthquakes had increased
significantly during the 1980s – a trend that continued in the 1990s. These earthquakes
were the direct result of mining activities and posed a risk to both workers and
equipment, and the mining companies employed a seismic indicator system to improve
the safety in the mines. Thus, the late 1980s saw a change in the human-environment
indicators in the Kola Peninsula. The new indicators were based on the salience of
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environmental and technological risk. They challenged the previous hierarchic cultural
storyline by questioning the capability of those high in the hierarchy to determine the
permissible range of variation. As the grid in this way was reduced, the Kola Mining
network moved toward an egalitarian cultural storyline (Article 3)
From the mid 1990s on, as the significance of complex utilization diminished, the Kola
mining network has adopted a more market-oriented view of the environment and natural
resources. Several factors led to this change. At the downfall of the Soviet Union, much
of the domestic market for the mineral products disappeared. Typically, the quality of
these products, while acceptable on the Russian domestic market, did not meet the
demands of the international market. Moreover, as the regional industrial actors had little
experience in international trade, they were ill prepared to market their products to
international customers. As a consequence, production levels of mineral products in the
Kola Peninsula dropped as much as by 69% between 1990 and 1994 (Article 1). The
industrial operators were forced to focus on product quality rather than a large-scale
complex utilization. What is more, the plummeting production levels meant that the net
pollution levels from the industry took a downwards turn as well (Figure 3).
In the minds of the decision makers, this solved, at least partly, the environmental
problems of the Kola Peninsula. The old end-of-pipe environmental protection systems
were perceived to be more than sufficient to manage the remaining pollution from the
industry. But the customers on the international market were not convinced. The Kola
Peninsula has, after all, a reputation of being one of the most severely polluted spots on
earth. To improve its image in the international market, the industry relies increasingly on
international standards for environmental and social responsibility. The level of emissions
remained a key indicator for the environmental performance of the mining industry but it
is increasingly being defined by actors and standards outside the Kola Peninsula and even
Russia.
Uncertainty related to the market also plays an important role in what is left of the
complex utilization strategy. While in the current situation the mining industry does not
view the utilization of old production wastes as profitable, it is believed that market
fluctuations may quickly change the picture in a way that complex utilization, once again,
becomes a key environmental and natural resource strategy.
The key environmental indicators for complex utilization were the absolute emission
levels but, also, the degree of pollution feedback into production. Naturally, this feedback
also had a cost in the Soviet economic system, which was read in terms of eco-efficiency.
Environmental indicators, many of them still measuring emission levels, have been
increasingly utilized in the new market-based environmental strategy. This means that the
known solutions to environmental problems in the region, such as complex utilization,
are given priority only when they have a sufficient profit margin. The choice of indicators
itself is subject to market fluctuation and, consequently, has become more uncertain than
ever before. In the cultural theory perspective, this plays out as a reduction in group
cohesion and a shift towards an individualistic cultural storyline.
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Figure 3. Sulphur dioxide emissions (in 1000t) from the cupro-nickel industries of the Kola
Peninsula. Data collected from the Severonikel and Pechenganikel mining companies.
Although the Kola mining network has played a central role in the way environmental
strategy and governance have been formed in the Kola Peninsula, actors outside the
network have been influential as well. Environmental co-operation (Figure 1) with the
Nordic countries is a fairly recent phenomenon in the Kola Peninsula, but it does date
back to the end of the Soviet period. In the following subsection I take a look at how
environmental co-operation has influenced environmental strategy and governance in the
Kola Peninsula through the Pechenganikel restructuring process. In this context, I use
policy networks to illustrate the competing alternatives for environmental strategy during
changing governance.
4.4. Co-operation: From Centralized to Fragmented Negotiations
In 1985, sulphur dioxide emissions from the Pechenganikel cupro-nickel smelters in the
North-West corner of the Kola Peninsula amounted to 343 000 t, exceeding 50% of the
region’s total sulphur emissions (Article 1). The emission volumes had grown
consistently from the 1960s on and—contrary to what the reader may expect—the Soviet
government and the mining industry in the Kola Peninsula did consider the emissions a
serious problem to the well-being of the region. Consequently, a central aim of the
complex utilization plan in 1988 was to increase the profitability of the collaborating
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industries and, as a side benefit, convert over 80 per cent of the region’s sulphur dioxide
emissions into sulphuric acid (Luzin, Peshev et al., 1988).
At the same time, ecosystem destruction in the Russian Kola Peninsula received great
media attention in the neighbouring Norway and Finland. The Norwegians feared that
their north-eastern coastline ecosystems would meet the same fate as those on the Russian
side (Hønneland, 2003). The Finnish debate, in turn, focused on forest defoliation in the
Finnish Lapland, which was assumed to be induced by sulphur dioxide and heavy metal
emissions from the Kola Peninsula (Väliverronen, 1996).
In 1989, Soviet Union and Finland launched a joint project to reduce the emissions at
Pechenganikel. The actual environmental impacts of mining in the Kola Peninsula were
not widely known in the West at that time, and the co-operation was driven rather by
economic and political incentives than by environmental concern. The Finnish
government considered the joint project a sign of good relations between Finland and the
Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders, in turn, used it as a showcase and an experiment of the
political and economic restructuring—and a key element of complex utilization (Darst,
2001). The reduction of the Pechenganikel emissions through international co-operation
during the late 1980s, thus, needs to be understood as a minor part of large-scale
industrial restructuring. What is more, it was the only part of the complex utilization plan
that was made public. A dominant covert driver on the Soviet side was to increase the
production capacity of the mining industry in the Kola Peninsula as a whole.
In spite of its political, economic and environmental importance, the Finnish-Soviet joint
venture proved extremely difficult to implement. The Finnish mining company
Outokumpu proposed to reduce the Pechenganikel sulphur dioxide and heavy metal
emissions at the cost of USD 640 million (Interfax, 1993b). In 1992, the Russian
government rejected this as too expensive. In the spring of 1993, Norilsk Nikel released a
tender for the reconstruction of its subsidiary Pechenganikel (Interfax, 1993a). The
winner of the tender was a Scandinavian consortium consisting of Norwegian, Finnish
and Swedish governments, private companies and intergovernmental agencies. Their
reduced budget of reconstruction was USD 300 million. For this budget, the Norwegian
government would chip in with USD 42 million. On July 1, 1995, the Russian
government, referring to the LRTAP, and to the severity of environmental problems on
the Kola Peninsula, announced that it had allocated USD 42 million to the project of
reconstructing Pechenganikel2. The remaining part of the entire USD 300 million
excepting the Norwegian support was left for Norilsk Nikel to pay.
Meanwhile, however, research results in Finland showed that the forest damage in
Finnish Lapland was not caused by the Russian emissions but by a combination of
several factors. First, during the winter of 1986-1987, the root systems of the forests in
Lapland were damaged, which resulted in nutrient deficiency and defoliation during the
following summer. Second, sprout loss was caused by an outburst of a fungal disease.
Third, reindeer grazing on protective lichen cover caused a decline in the microbiological
activity of the forest soil. Finally, climatic changes were shown to cause occasional
2 Resolution N 667 of the Government of the Russian Federation
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decline in the forest foliage of North-Eastern Lapland (Tikkanen and Niemelä, 1995).
Consequently, the Finnish debate on the Kola Peninsula emissions was soon subdued
(Väliverronen, 1996). In Norway, however, the debate on smelter impacts persisted. In
1997, after five years with no visible progress in the co-operation for emission reductions
in Pechenganikel, Nordic environmental organizations asked the Nordic Investment Bank
(NIB) to initiate negotiations with Norilsk Nikel. While Norilsk Nikel had severe
economic problems at the time, it had not—unlike most Russian heavy industries—
experienced much reduction in production volumes after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
As a result, the company was in 1997 producing large quantities of commodities with
inefficient production facilities topped with emission levels far above its global
competitors.
At this point, two very different strategies to solve the Pechenganikel issue had been at
play. First, the Soviet and later Russian governments were in favour of the complex
utilization plan but would not allow the Western counterparts into the details of these
plans. It is therefore hardly surprising that complex utilization has been completely absent
from the international negotiations for Pechenganikel restructuring. The policy network
behind complex utilization, therefore, was reduced to Soviet/Russian government, private
and public Russian research organizations, and the management of the mining companies.
The second strategy, end-of-pipe pollution reduction, had initially been the primary aim
of the Nordic countries in the co-operation with Pechenganikel. Norwegian politicians
insisted on an unconditional reduction of the pollution volumes but paid little regard to
the effects this would have had on the economy of the Murmansk region. In this strategy,
the key actors were Western government officials and engineers, and the solution to the
emission problem was to be found with Western technology (Darst, 2001). The Russians
would act as spectators and potential financers. At the end of the privatization process,
however, those responsible for the Pechenganikel project at the NIB were working
directly with the different departments of Norilsk Nikel. Neither the Russian federal
government nor the Murmansk regional government were involved in the negotiations.
Interestingly, the two negotiating parties—NIB and Norilsk Nikel—both needed to
change their understanding of the desired outcome of the restructuring project. Although
pollution reduction was a key aim of the Nordic countries, the NIB was to find out that
pollution reduction through end-of-pipe methods alone was not a viable alternative for a
business organization. Increasing economic returns were needed in restructuring projects.
The mining company, in turn, was to learn that a positive environmental image can help
bring in the desired returns on investment.
In other words, the co-operation partners had arrived at a shared understanding of eco-
efficiency, with specific engineering solutions for Pechenganikel. This appears crucial to
project implementation. In the mid-1990s, the two parties had goals that involved
strategies representing two very different approaches towards eco-efficiency: one
conditioned with pollution reduction and the other conditioned with the development of
production capacity. Suffice it to say these two approaches may have very different
environmental impacts and consequently stood in the way of effective project
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implementation. What is more, those claiming to be involved in the Pechenganikel case
tended not to share the same view of the composition of the policy network. While the
NIB emphasized the role of direct negotiations with Norilsk Nikel, the Murmansk
regional government felt strongly that it should be involved as well.
In sum, the long-term Nordic co-operation to reduce pollution from Pechenganikel
reflects a number of changes both in the power relations of the policy network and the
desired technical fix. Analogous to the ways in which complex utilization was promoted
in the 1980s, Norilsk Nikel saw an opportunity in the Nordic concern over the
environmental situation in the Murmansk region and tried to finance its production
development with capital from the Nordic countries and the Russian government. This
contradicted the expectations of the Nordic partners and the restructuring project was
stopped. With the rising global nickel prices in the early 2000s—and certainly with the
help of export tax exemptions from the Russian government—Norilsk Nikel suddenly
gained enough capital to be able to conduct the capacity development project itself, with
corresponding reductions in sulphur dioxide emissions. It can be concluded, that the
significance of the Nordic-Russian co-operation lies more on the persistent Nordic action
in the Pechenganikel restructuring project rather than on the Nordic financial input. In
fact, it is only with the introduction of the ISO 14001 EMS that Norilsk Nikel has tied the
Pechenganikel restructuring project to its environmental performance: in its annual
reports between 1999 and 2004, the company has highlighted the Pechenganikel
reconstruction as an example of successful environmental management and emphasized
the co-operation with the Nordic countries on one hand and the LRTAP on the other. The
fact that the NIB and Norilsk Nikel were able to arrive at a shared understanding of the
specific meaning of eco-efficiency in the case appears to be a key issue in successful
implementation. It is also likely that government absence from the recent negotiations
between the NIB and Norilsk Nikel has had a similar impact.
Western government agencies now often negotiate directly with the executives of
individual Russian companies. In part, this is due to the decision-making power of
individual industrial companies having increased significantly during privatization. The
success of co-operation may, however, depend critically on the organization, business,
and the economic performance of the company.
The different policy networks behind the environmental strategies in the Kola Peninsula
help in understanding the formation of environmental governance in the region. Yet,
merely describing the policy networks does not say anything about what goes on in the
organizations implementing environmental strategy. To shed light on this side of the
story, I will in the following section look—once again—at complex utilization and the
EMS. This time, however, I will look at them through the conceptual apparatus of
strategic fit.
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5. Fit in the Environmental Strategies of Mining: Lessons from the Case
Study
Strategic fit measures how well strategy is in line with its context. In this dissertation,
environmental strategies are in focus. The context is therefore conditioned by the natural
environment and, in particular, the risk of negative impacts on the natural environment. I
have approached the environmental strategies of industrial organizations with two
theoretical concepts: framing and institutional isomorphism. In the case context, I use
framing to analyze complex utilization and institutional isomorphism to analyze
standardized EMS. As noted previously, these two environmental strategies have been
developed in the case study region during different time periods but both are likely to
remain as parts of the environmental policy of the Kola Peninsula. I will in the following
first explain strategic fit through the framing of complex utilization and thereafter discuss
it through institutional isomorphism of EMS.
Throughout the past 75 years, individuals in the Kola mining network have influenced
natural resource use and environmental protection in the Kola Peninsula. A pattern of
maintaining and re-introducing the concept of complex utilization is pervasive in how
these individuals have claimed to solve the environmental and economic problems in the
region. What is more, these arguments, while changing in style and nuance, have
remained fairly unaltered the past 75 years. Sorting these arguments based on their
similarity yields five simple frames (Table 4): nature, economy, science, efficiency, and
self-sufficiency (Article 4).
First, the way in which nature should be understood in relation to industrial activities has
been a key driving force behind complex utilization. The arguments specifying this
relation have changed from the “exploitation of nature” in the 1930s through “nature
protection” in the 1980s to the “adaptation of industry to nature” in the 1990s. We have
formed these categories on the basis of the most frequent expressions of industry-
environment relationship that the interviewees and literature sources used. Second, as the
Russian economy relies strongly on the extraction and utilization of the nation’s natural
resources, the decision makers in the Kola Peninsula, too, have made arguments for
strengthening the economy with complex utilization. The role of complex utilization in
these arguments, however, has changed from “constitutive of the national economy” in
the 1930s to “saving the economy from further losses” in the 1980s further to
“strengthening the regional economy” in the 1990s. Third, the role of science in the Kola
Peninsula has been important to the thriving mining industry there and, therefore, the
relationship between science and complex utilization has been frequently highlighted.
The arguments for science follow a pattern of change from complex utilization as “pure
natural science” of the 1930s, as “applied natural science” of the 1980s and, finally, as
“science of military-strategic significance” of the 1990s. Fourth, complex utilization has
been understood as a way of obtaining a maximum value with minimum input of labour
and mineral resources in the 1930s; as a specialization strategy against diminishing ore
quality in the 1980s; and as a way of producing competitive products with low
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environmental impact in the 1990s. Fifth, and finally, decision makers in the Kola
Peninsula have linked complex utilization with issues of self-sufficiency. During the
Soviet time, this was self-evident, and complex utilization was seen as a way of
eliminating the need for imported raw materials. In the Post-soviet times, complex
utilization has been seen as a way of securing the production of military-strategic
materials—an argument also found in the science frame.
The Kola mining network has made significant efforts to achieve strategic fit of complex
utilization with the repeated redefinition of the aforementioned frames. Some of the
frames, such as efficiency, nature and economy, are so general that they could, on the
face of it, provide a rationale for environmental strategy in virtually any cultural context.
In the Kola Peninsula, the expected efficiency gains from achieving fit of complex
utilization during the late 1980s were substantial (Article 1). Yet, the underlying
arguments of the efficiency frame had changed significantly during the Soviet years and
continue to do so today. Other frames, such as self-sufficiency, are bound to the specific
context of the complex utilization strategy.
Framing of environmental strategies is a general activity that is not limited to the Kola
Peninsula. In fact, there are striking similarities between the framing of complex
utilization and that of industrial ecology in entirely different contexts. Perhaps the most
famous case of industrial ecology is an industrial park in Kalundborg, Denmark. During
the past 30 years, the industries in Kalundborg have developed a complex waste-reuse
network that significantly reduces the use of virgin raw material (Grann, 1997).
Kalundborg has therefore frequently been presented as the ultimate embodiment of
industrial ecology: to design industrial systems to resemble natural ecosystems (Frosch
and Gallopoulos, 1989; Ehrenfeld and Gertler, 1997; Cohen-Rosenthal, 2000). Critics of
industrial ecology have pointed out that Kalundborg may not be a good example of an
application of industrial ecology: the mainstay of the system is the coal-fired power plant
(Asnaes) on which nearly all waste and by-product flows depend. If this installation were
to be shut down, the whole system would collapse (O’Rourke, Connelly et al, 1996). The
Kalundborg industrial ecosystem participants have, however, been able to demonstrate
significant reductions in emissions and in the use of virgin raw material. They have
recently reported an overall reduction of 25 per cent reduction in water consumption
(equalling 2,9 million cubic meters per annum); 20 000 tons in oil consumption per
annum; 80 000 tons fly ash waste per annum; 200 000 tons gypsum waste per annum;
130 000 tons carbon dioxide emissions per annum3. In addition, the industrial ecosystem
partners have reported a number of smaller reductions in the use of chemicals (Grann,
1997).
It has been claimed that the difficulties of implementing industrial ecology on the
grassroots level result largely from a lack of social legitimacy and poor political
embedding (Lifset 2005; Cohen and Howard 2006). The numerous studies puzzling over
the difficulty of replicating the Kalundborg industrial ecosystem illustrate the challenges
of overcoming contextual differences in implementation. The dilemma is that, on one
hand, Kalundborg is seen as a benchmark for industrial ecology, but on the other hand, its
3 The Kalundborg Centre for Industrial Symbiosis (www.symbiosis.dk). Accessed 15 June 2008.
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success is frequently attributed to its unique characteristics (Brings Jacobsen 2006;
Heeres, Vermeulen et al, 2004; Ehrenfeld and Chertow, 2001; Andrews 1999; Cosgriff
Dunn and Steinemann 1998).
Kalundborg and the Kola Peninsula are in many ways of a different scale. The former is a
municipality of 604 km2 and 50000 inhabitants, while the latter is a province of 144900
km2 and nearly 900000 inhabitants. Kalundborg houses a number of medium size
industrial companies, while in the Kola Peninsula vast amounts of mineral resources are
extracted in numerous locations far apart. In spite of the differences in scale of these two
regions, similar frames (such as nature, efficiency and economy) have been used by the
promoters of both complex utilization and industrial ecology (Table 4). The arguments
behind the frames, however, were different between the two regions. Moreover, these
arguments had changed substantially within the complex utilization case as the industrial
system of the Kola Peninsula evolved. While ostensibly unaltered, the frames were
aligned to resonate with the audience or recipient that was to be mobilized behind the
framed idea (Article 4). This implies that the frames of natural resource use, such as those
of complex utilization, can be viewed as strategic design efforts to invigorate existing
values or narratives, to encompass concerns of potential adherents, and to change the
prevailing understanding of a particular issue (Snow, Rochford et al., 1986; Benford and
Snow, 2000).
Table 4. The frames of complex utilization and industrial ecology in Kalundborg. Adapted from
Article 4. The shared frames between the two cases are placed in adjacent cells in the table. The case-
specific frames are placed on individual rows.
COMPLEX UTILIZATION INDUSTRIAL ECOLOGY IN
KALUNDBORG
Economy Economy
Efficiency Efficiency
Nature Environment
Sustainability
Self-sufficiency
Science
Mental proximity
FR
A
M
E
Awareness
In addition to the different types of frames found in the case studies of the Kola Peninsula
and Kalundborg, the process of framing itself is of interest. Successful political
embedding of scientific concepts depends on effective framing, which, in turn, depends
on three interrelated factors (Article 4). First, generalized frames, such as nature or
economy, need to be made meaningful to a variety of actors in the policy network and
aligned with their perceptions of the issue at hand. Second, the relative significance of
different frames used in the promotion of a scientific-technical model varies in time and
between cultural contexts. This variation needs to be taken into account by those applying
science-based sustainability standards across cultural contexts. Third, not only the
generalized frames but also the more subtle ones particular to each case need to be
elicited and accounted for. In every new implementation of industrial ecology in a new
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cultural context, there are specific concerns, topics and particularities, which, if left
unattended, will reduce the value of the Kalundborg industrial ecology as a science-based
sustainability standard. The comparison of Kalundborg and the Kola Peninsula shows the
interpretative flexibility of industrial ecology, i.e., that it can be applied to cases that are
very different in their technical details.
The second key environmental strategy of the Kola Peninsula mining industry is that
based on international EMS. The use of EMS has proliferated in the industry during the
late 1990s and early 2000s and, today, all mining companies in the region hold some
form of an EMS. The industry has used the EMS in order to gain legitimacy from various
stakeholder groups. This type of legitimacy seeking typically reflects some form of
institutional isomorphism: mimetic, normative or coercive. Institutional isomorphism and
strategic fit may be seen as closely linked but contradictory processes. Strategic fit is
defined as a process by which an organization functions more efficiently (Venkatraman
and Prescott, 1990). Isomorphism, in turn, makes organizations more similar but does not
necessarily make them more efficient (DiMaggio and Powell). In attempting to achieve
strategic fit, companies may replicate the practices of their successful competitors
(mimetic isomorphism) or match their goals with the perceived values of the employees
and shareholders (normative isomorphism). In the Kola Peninsula case study, the EMS
driven environmental strategy is likely to make the mining companies more aligned with
the requirements of the international market. Yet, there is no evidence that the mining
corporations would have become more effective after adopting EMS. Three specific
drivers of EMS adoption can be linked to institutional isomorphism in the case study:
market pressure, organizational culture, and the influence of individuals. I will discuss
each driver in the context of institutional forces in brief.
First, a predominant driver of adopting EMS in the Kola Peninsula has been that of
market pressure. Generally, market pressure is understood as stemming from either the
consumers’ requirement for audited environmental performance or peer pressure from
other companies, or general reputation in the market (Esty and Porter, 1998; Warhurst
and Mitchell, 2000; Hilson, 2003). A change in the behaviour of a company as a response
to peer pressure and consumer demand signals the presence of coercive isomorphism.
“Coercion” is not necessarily exercised by a governmental authority but, as DiMaggio
and Powell (1991) note, “direct imposition of standard operating procedures and
legitimated rules and structures also occurs outside the governmental area” (DiMaggio
and Powell, 1991: 68). In the Kola Peninsula case, market pressure was expressed as
either direct signals from customers or as indirect intuition among the executives of
something that the ‘‘international market requires’’ (Article 2).
Second, the change in organizational culture in the mining companies has been
noteworthy during the privatization period. This change has been particularly strong in
environmental thinking and boils down to the companies now having to conduct
environmental management independently without state control. Institutional theorists
have argued that incorporating an externally legitimated formal structure (which an EMS
without a doubt is) increases the commitment of the organization’s members and its
external constituents (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Legitimacy from the employees and
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shareholders of the companies in the Kola Peninsula has become increasingly important
as organizational culture changes (Article 2). Restructuring the organization for
environmental management brings the organization’s actions more closely with the
perceived values of the employees and shareholders. In this way, the change in
organizational culture indicates the presence of normative isomorphism, in which
organizations adopt the general norms of the industry as part of their regular operations.
Third, the influence of individuals is among the key drivers for EMS in the Kola
Peninsula mining industry (Article 2). Environmentally oriented individuals—if granted
proper legitimacy—can introduce elements of environmental thinking into the
organization’s practices from outside the organization itself. Take the environmental
managers in the Kola Peninsula as an example. They are active members of the local
community and express sustainability concerns regarding the operations of their
companies. As these individuals clearly have a personal stake in how well their company
is performing with respect to the environment, they are seen by the corporation as
guaranteeing pragmatic legitimacy. During the recent decade, environmental initiatives
driven by environmental managers in the Kola Peninsula have enabled companies to
maintain and recreate their environmental reputation among each other, the regional
authorities, international organizations, and the corporate level management (Article 2).
This is normative isomorphism in the making: it signals a “growth and elaboration of
professional networks that span organizations and across which new models diffuse
rapidly” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 71). In addition, by introducing environmental
thinking into the regular practices of the corporate organization the individuals strengthen
normative isomorphism.
So far I have mentioned two specific groups that can grant legitimacy to an organization:
employees and shareholders. In theory, however, legitimacy can be granted by any
stakeholder of the organization. Yet from the organization’s point of view not all
stakeholders are equally significant in granting legitimacy. Moreover, different
stakeholder groups exert different types of pressures on the organization (Mitchell, Agle
et al., 1997). In the case study of this dissertation, the federal government was perceived
to be a dominant stakeholder alongside employees and shareholders (Article 2). But while
the shareholders resort to market pressure as a key rationale for good environmental
conduct, the federal government exercises regulatory power on the companies. In yet
another way, the employees affect legitimacy through the aforementioned influence of
individuals, and changes in organizational culture and learning. These three stakeholder
groups are the most significant ones granting legitimacy and receive prominent attention
from the management of the mining companies. Expectant stakeholder groups—
including the regional scientific community, international NGOs, foreign governmental
organizations, customers and competitors—are viewed as potentially significant grantors
of legitimacy. Finally, local and regional NGOs are considered as latent stakeholder
groups by the mining industry, and are not currently viewed as significant grantors of
legitimacy. These different stakeholder groups are categorized according to stakeholder
salience and the different drivers in Table 5.
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Table 5: Stakeholder salience within the drivers of adopting EMS in the Kola Peninsula mining
industries. Adapted from Article 2.
Driver
Market
pressure
Stakeholder
pressure
Regulatory
pressure
Organizational
culture and
learning
Influence of
individuals
Latent Local and
regional
NGO
Expectant Customers,
rivals
KSC, EU,
international
NGO,
foreign
governments,
regional
government
Regional
government
Regional
colleagues / rivals
St
ak
eh
ol
de
r s
al
ie
nc
e
Dominant Shareholders Federal
government
Employees,
shareholders
Suffice it to say, the Kola Peninsula mining industry needs legitimacy to secure its
resource access. But according to the managers the industry really only needs legitimacy
granted by the elite fraction of the society—the Ministry of Natural Resources, the
Murmansk region governor, the President of Russia, or the customers. A lack of social
legitimacy granted by marginalized groups in the Kola Peninsula, like the Sámi, will
likely not prevent the mining activities from continuing. Therefore, the managers have
not perceived them as salient stakeholders. On the positive side, however, the industry
does feel the pressure from the market to clean up its act. This opens a possibility for
NGOs (even local ones in cooperation with foreign organizations) to question the
legitimacy of those doing business with the Kola Peninsula industry and – consequently –
the legitimacy of the industry itself.
Summing up, by approaching strategic fit with the theoretical concepts of framing and
isomorphism, the dissertation delivers two observations. First, strategic fit has in the case
study been achieved by the maintenance and reproduction of frames that operate on
different levels of generality. It should be noted, however, that this case-based
interpretation of strategic fit deviates somewhat from the definition of fit for a company
strategy. The case study focuses on a network rather than on an organization. Strategy
researchers typically focus on the business organization when analyzing fit. The approach
in this dissertation, therefore, runs the risk of obscuring the organization and its
boundaries when discussing strategic fit. The network school, however, has called for
analysis of networks of organizations with interdependent strategies (Venkatraman and
Camillus, 1984). In this respect, the frame study of the Kola Mining network and its
efforts to promote interdependent environmental strategies is of value. The network has
actively worked to politically embed and shape complex utilization in a given
institutional environment at a given time.
Second, strategic fit is influenced by the institutional forces within and outside the
organization but also by the salience of the stakeholders granting legitimacy to the
organization. The conceptual difference between “fit” for a company’s strategy and the
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“fit” of the development of EMS in the Kola Peninsula with the socio-political context is,
however, noteworthy. “Fit” in the latter case is less of an objective than an outcome. That
is, it has been the result of the interplay of different institutional forces in the case. It is
important to clarify at this point that isomorphic forces emerge from real-life practices of
individuals in organizations. The new generation of environmental managers in the Kola
Peninsula, for instance, actively create a new type of professionalism that includes rules
about professional and organizational behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). Whether
institutional isomorphism of environmental management in the case region has increased
organizational efficiency is a question for future research.
On a related notion, indicators I discussed previously in this section contribute both to the
strategy formation process and to the formation of policy networks. Indicators of human-
environment interaction are more than (ostensibly) objective measurements of the socio-
ecological system, conducted outside of the system itself. An auxiliary value of indicators
lies in their ability to open up a dialogue for network building, trust creation and
considerations of power relations in a community. Contributing to network building and
considerations of power relations, indicators are an important part of the formation of
policy networks. In an important sense, therefore, indicators act more as communicative
devices than as externally imposed objective criteria. In the Kola Peninsula case, the
choice of indicators has been an important part of the self-definition process by which a
community separates those who belong to it from those who do not. The determination of
permissible value ranges for indicators, in turn, has been a key aspect of rule-setting by
the community.
Finally, environmental policy and management in North-West Russia is in constant focus
of international politics and the operational part of these politics rests heavily on co-
operation. This highlights the relevance of studying corporate environmental strategy for
those involved in international environmental co-operation. International environmental
co-operation is a complicated field and it needs to resonate with different governance
styles and decision-making cultures. In this context, the concept of complex utilization is
pivotal. It both antedates and closely resembles industrial ecology that was developed in
the West. This suggests that a lack of technical knowledge was not the principal cause of
the well-known environmental problems that existed in the Soviet Union. On the
contrary, the potential benefits of complex utilization were not realized because Soviet
political and economic institutions provided weak incentives for pollution control and
efficient resource use. This is a familiar story. Complex utilization, however, has not been
forgotten among the mining specialists, business executives and politicians of the Kola
Peninsula and it continues to play a part in the industrial future of the region. Depending
on the way in which complex utilization is framed and the boundary conditions it is
given, the Western aid partners will have a key role in the environmental development of
the Kola Peninsula. It is this future of the Kola Peninsula environment that I will turn to
next.
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6. Future Trends in Environmental Strategy in the Kola Peninsula
The preceding sections have given an outline of how mining-related environmental
strategies have been developed in the Kola Peninsula in policy networks with the
objective to achieve strategic fit. In this section I look into the future and juxtapose two
alternative future paths for mining-related environmental strategy (see also Figure 1). On
one hand, it is possible that the mining industry will continue on the same path as it has
done throughout the 2000s. It will continue to develop its environmental strategy
primarily on the basis of signals from the international market and a few dominant
stakeholder groups. Straightforward pollution permits issued by the federal government
continue to play a minor role. On the other hand, it is possible that complex utilization
will be strengthened as an environmental strategy in the region. This re-establishment of
complex utilization would require substantial government subsidies, although business
interest in complex utilization has been increasing recently as well (details in a moment).
How the combination of these two strategies will play out in the end is contingent upon
two major issues: the development of the Russian federal government’s environmental
policy and the development of the energy sector in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region.
6.1. Environmental Policy in Russia post-2000
In 2002, a new Framework Law on Environmental Protection replaced the former
environmental protection law from 1991. The new Federal Law is indicative of the
federal government’s attempts to reinstate its power over the regions during the 2000s.
This re-centralization stands in clear contradiction to the decentralization of power to the
regions in the 1990s. As the regions were powerful relative to the federal government in
the early 1990s, decentralization of power was perceived as crucial to keep the Russian
federation from falling apart. The economic crisis of 1998, however, hit the regions with
a force that brought them to tighten their relationship with the federal administration. In
addition, one of the central aims of President Putin’s recentralization of power has been
to reduce ambiguity and corruption in the regional administration. During the 2000s, this
has brought a need to clarify the division of responsibilities between the federal and
regional administration, and has led to a series of reforms in regional governance
(Solanko and Tekoniemi, 2005; Ollus, Simola et al., 2007).
Along with the legislative reform, the Murmansk Region committee of natural resources
was abolished in September 2004. As the natural resources of the region were controlled
by both the federal and the regional administration, the committee as well fell under the
control of the Ministry of natural resources and the Governor of the Murmansk Region.
After the 2004 reform, the ministry of natural resources lost its economic and controlling
functions and was left with functions to prepare regulatory laws only. The connection
between the governor and the Ministry of natural resources was thus lost as the functions
were re-allocated. All environmental issues related to mining in the Murmansk region are
now controlled by the state inspection and their resource use is controlled by the
agencies. The power of the regional administration over mining companies is restricted to
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territorial development and construction work. The 2004 reform can be seen as an
attempt to re-establish a centralized control over environmental issues in the Russian
regions. It holds at least some promise for improving both the independence and
effectiveness of compliance and monitoring functions.
The effects of these recent reforms on the environmental strategies of mining in the Kola
Peninsula are yet to be seen. The Kola mining network’s attempts to re-establish complex
utilization have rested heavily on the federal involvement in mining-industrial strategy. If
the government in fact is willing and able to design effective policies that guide corporate
environmental strategy, complex utilization may well be developed further as a parallel
strategy to the EMS.
In terms of indicators, they would again measure either the market value or the military
strategic significance of waste raw materials (Vinogradov, Kalinnikov et al., 2003). In
addition, novel indicators would be needed due to the uncertainty in the complex
utilization system. That is, the system would produce new kinds of wastes for which there
are currently no practises of treatment in the mining industry. On the whole, these novel
indicators should have a multi-industrial focus as opposed to the plant-specific indicator
systems that are already in place. They would also need to enable decision makers to
make a priori judgements of negative environmental impacts of new production
configurations. Lessons from industrial ecology may prove useful in the possible re-
development of complex utilization and its holistic indicators. As has been shown,
however, applying concepts from industrial ecology in non-Western contexts may result
in outcomes that are far from being environmentally sound (Article 1). Recommendations
of developing industrial ecology in the Kola Peninsula should therefore be taken with
caution.
How about co-operation in this scheme? Due to the issues of military security associated
with complex utilization, international co-operation would likely be limited in that
particular strategy. Yet the 30-year-old history of direct co-operation between Finnish
companies and the Kola Peninsula mining industry should not be forgotten. Many of the
enrichment processes have been designed and built by Finnish companies. Environmental
co-operation, as illustrated in subsection 4.4, has proved more difficult. In this respect,
complex utilization, being a technology-oriented environmental strategy, may yield
increased possibilities for direct business to business co-operation. Such co-operation
should be facilitated jointly by the Nordic and the Russian governments.
The other possible outcome is that the federal government remains uninterested in the
environmental management of the Kola Peninsula in spite of the general trend of re-
centralization. Consequently, the regional government would be left even more unarmed
than before to promote its own environmental objectives. This means that the mining
companies could continue to pursue their own environmental strategies, primarily guided
by the drivers behind the EMS. An important emerging trend is “green marketing” for the
worst polluters in the region. The indicators related to this trend should be sensitive for
strong advocate groups such as foreign partners and other market actors, but the
expectant and latent stakeholder groups should not be forgotten (Table 5). These groups
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may gain power and legitimacy in the future and increase their salience. The development
of the energy sector (see subsection 6.2), for instance, may directly compromise the rights
of the indigenous Sámi people. This would increase the salience of the regional and
international NGOs.
In terms of co-operation, the multilateral environmental programs initiated by the EU and
the Nordic Countries in the Kola Peninsula will continue (Article 2). In the best case, the
lack of government coordination can lead to “windows of opportunity” in which the
mining industry is able to improve its environmental performance through co-operation
with foreign partners. The case of Pechenganikel restructuring is an example of such co-
operation. Similar examples can be found elsewhere in Russia as well (Tynkkynen 2008).
Although important, the federal government’s environmental policy is only one of the
factors affecting the future of mining-related environmental strategy in the Kola
Peninsula. The Russian North-West houses significant hydrocarbon reserves with several
as of yet unexploited gas and oil fields. How these reserves are exploited and how the
hydrocarbons are transported will have a great impact on the economy of the Kola
Peninsula. At the same time, the hydrocarbon issue will affect the development of
complex utilization in an important respect.
6.2. Complex Utilization and the Development of the Energy Sector
The oil and gas reserves in the Barents Sea area of the Arctic shelf have been known for
decades. With the current record high oil price the reserves are becoming increasingly
lucrative. One of the largest deposits in the area, the Shtockmanovskoye gas field was
discovered in 1988 with proven reserves of substantial 2200 billion cubic metres. The
field is located 650 km North of Murmansk in the Arctic Sea under harsh weather
conditions. A number of smaller oil and gas fields have been identified in the Arctic shelf
closer to shore but none of these have as of yet been exploited. The development of the
Shtockmanovskoye field has been difficult not only due to the harsh weather. Both
political and corporate strategic interests have stalled the field from being exploited
during the past (Brunstad, Eivind et al., 2004; Kovalev, 2007). For the Kola Peninsula
economy, the utilization of Shtockmanovskoye field would certainly give a boost.
The Kola Peninsula construction industry, having experienced a radical downfall in the
early 1990s, would benefit from new onshore infrastructure projects for the gas industry.
It is hardly surprising that the construction industry of the Kola Peninsula is closely
connected to the mining industry through complex utilization. Aluminium production
from nepheline tailings (one of the key processes in complex utilization) creates
substantial amounts of Portland cement (2,5 tons cement per 1 ton nepheline). This side
product could be used for onshore infrastructure development in the Kola Peninsula.
Currently, around 10% of the nepheline tailings (1 million tons annually) is enriched into
nepheline concentrate and transported to the Leningrad region for alumina extraction
(Article 1). There are no equivalent installations for nepheline treatment in the Kola
Peninsula but the situation may change in the near future. In 2006, the fertilizer producer
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Akron won a tender auction over two apatite-nepheline deposits in the Khibiny
Mountains of the Kola Peninsula. The company aims to produce 3 million tons apatite
concentrate and 2 million tons nepheline concentrate annually from the deposit. The
Russian aluminium giant SuAl has expressed its interest in further treatment of the
nepheline concentrate (Interfax, 2006a). Whether it would start operating a new plant in
the Kola Peninsula or export the nepheline elsewhere is an open question. The first
alternative would effectively re-establish complex utilization as an environmental
strategy in the Kola Peninsula.
As regards the main mineral products of the Kola Peninsula mining companies, no
significant growth in extraction will be expected. However, with the recent dramatic
increases in commodities prices, the industry has been able to maintain its production.
The price of nickel skyrocketed from a mere USD 4000 per ton in 1998 up to almost
USD 55000 in 2007. Copper prices have experience a similar though more modest trend
from below USD 2000 in 1998 to above USD 8000 in 20054. Although nickel prices
descended below USD 25000 in 2008, the industry is still in a much better position than
10 years ago. At the same time, Kola Mining and Metallurgical Company has maintained
its metals production around 200 000 ton during the 2000s5.
With the new global increases in food prices the jump in the price of mineral fertilizers is
also expected to continue. The average European spot price of diammonium phosphate
(produced e.g. by Apatit mother company Phosagro in Russia) rose from USD 450 per
ton in July 2007 to USD 1200 per ton in May 2008. Apatit has been able to stabilize its
annual production of apatite concentrate (a raw material of mineral fertilizers such as
diammonium phosphate) to around 9 million tons during the past ten years and expects to
maintain the production level in the future6
A stable production level of apatite also means a stable production of nepheline (in
roughly equal amounts). The feasibility of alumina production from nepheline depends
on the market price of alternative sources, mainly bauxite. The United States average
bauxite price for 2006 was USD 28 per ton, with the corresponding alumina raw material
price USD 47 per ton (assuming 60% Al2O3) (U.S. Geological Survey, 2008). The Kola
Peninsula nepheline, in turn, was in 2006 sold at the price of USD 19 per ton, with the
corresponding alumina raw material price USD 63 per ton (assuming 30% Al2O3)
(Chibinskyi Vestnic, 2003). With today’s surging Chinese aluminium demand, bauxite
export prices up to USD 80 have been reported7. Consequently, alternative processes for
aluminium production, such as the nepheline process, may become economically
lucrative in the near future.
In the energy sector, the exploitation of the Shtockmanovskoye field may increase the
share of gas-based energy in the Kola Peninsula. The mining industry depends critically
on the energy produced in the Kola Peninsula. Currently, with the generation level around
4 London Metal Exchange (www.lme.com). Accessed 13.6.2008.
5 Norilsk Nikel Annual Report 2006 (www.nornik.ru). Accessed 13.6.2008.
6 Interview with a business manager of Joint Stock Company Apatit, 2004.
7 Reuters India (in.reuters.com). Accessed 15 June 2008.
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16 TWh annually, the region has an energy surplus of 25%. This surplus is exported to
the neighbouring Karelia, Finland, and Norway. Roughly one-half of the power produced
in the region is supplied by the four reactors of the Kola nuclear power plant (Kinnunen
and Korppoo, 2007). The two oldest reactors are planned for decommissioning between
2010 and 2020. One of the alternatives after decommission is to increase gas- and oil
powered energy conversion. This would change radically the energy structure of the Kola
Peninsula and would require large investments and political will from the Russian
government (Kinnunen and Korppoo, 2007).
Although the Murmansk regional government has little power over energy infrastructure
issues, it seems to be in favour of developing the thermal power base. In recent
negotiations with the Murmansk government, the Norwegian Hydro has expressed its
interest in aluminium production. The company would refine bauxite from the Komi
Republic at a new aluminium plant in the Kola Peninsula. The Murmansk Region
Governor Yuri Yevdokimov announced that the aluminium plant would be powered by a
new thermal power plant to be constructed in the Kola Peninsula. The thermal plant
would use gas from the Shtockmanovskoye gas field. Yevdokimov added—again echoing
the strategy of complex utilization—that Norsk Hydro should use the voluminous Kola
nepheline tailings as a source of aluminium rather than the Komi bauxite (Interfax,
2006b).
A second area of interest is the oil produced onshore in the Timan-Pechora basin east of
the Kola Peninsula. The oil exports from the basin are estimated to amount to 15 million
tons before 2010 (Brunstad, Eivind et al., 2004). The oil is currently exported via rail and
small tankers but plans to build a pipeline under the White sea and across the Kola
Peninsula are being considered (Tsukerman, 2002). The oil would further be exported
through the ice-free Murmansk deep harbour. This transport strategy would increase the
oil exports from Timan-Pechora up to 120 million tons (Brunstad, Eivind et al., 2004) but
the construction has also been stalled for a range of political and corporate strategic
interest conflicts. The Russian government has approved the pipeline already in 2003 on
the condition that it would be financed with private investments from the oil companies.
After the construction, however, the management of the pipeline would have to be
handed over to the Russian government (Brunstad, Eivind et al., 2004).
The effect of the pipeline to the Kola Peninsula economy would be similar to that of the
offshore gas extraction. The construction of the oil-industry infrastructure would benefit
the region’s construction industry and possibly provide a window of opportunity for
complex utilization. The increased oil flow through the region would also allow for the
change in the energy infrastructure of the Kola Peninsula. In addition, the construction of
the pipeline would facilitate access to the yet unexploited mineral reserves of the Eastern
Kola Peninsula, providing significant future prospects for the mining industry
(Tsukerman, 2002).
The flipside of both of these plans is that they would increase the risk of negative
environmental and social impacts in the Kola Peninsula. The development of the
Shtockmanovskoye gas field would pose risks to the marine ecosystems of the Barents
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Sea, particularly to the benthic species communities (Brunstad, Eivind et al., 2004). This
may have further negative effects on the fish populations depending on the benthic
ecosystems and, consequently, threaten the thriving Murmansk fishing industry. Similar
risks are associated with the oil pipeline construction. In addition, the oil pipeline
construction would interfere with the traditional reindeer husbandry of the indigenous
Sámi population in the central parts of the Kola Peninsula. The reindeer migratory paths
would likely to be compromised by the pipeline, which could in the extreme case lead to
the termination of reindeer husbandry in the Kola Peninsula (Robinson and Kassam,
1998; Brunstad, Eivind et al., 2004). This progression, however, could be circumvented
by drawing the pipeline along the South bank of the White Sea rather than through the
central Kola Peninsula.
7. Conclusion
The Russian political and economic reforms of the 1990s were expected to result in
political and economic institutions (and substantive outcomes) that would resemble those
of Europe’s industrial democracies. In fact, however, the Soviet system was replaced by
an anarchic economic order in which the legal mechanisms necessary to support well-
functioning markets were simply not in place. This is quite well-known. Less well
known, however, is how international efforts to “clean up” the environmental legacy of
the Soviet Union failed—fundamentally. They failed because proponents in Europe
focused on the technology-side while implicitly assuming that European institutional
structures could be taken for granted. This is a cautionary tale with important lessons for
all international environmental efforts that focus on nations where Western political-
economic institutions are not entrenched.
Consequently, this dissertation has focused less on the technological aspects of industrial
production (managing mass and energy flows to conserve resources and reduce pollution)
than on the difficult challenges that arise in bridging the gap between technical potential
and real-world implementation. Accounting for human factors, management practices,
and the boundary conditions imposed by public policy must play a key role in the
development of fields like industrial ecology. This is a cutting-edge, interdisciplinary
activity that links engineering and management with the general field of science and
technology studies. A key issue is how to translate scientific knowledge into positive
social outcomes.
The mining industry continues to play a significant role both in the economy and the
ecology of the European North. In this future, the environmental strategies chosen in the
Kola Peninsula are pivotal. From a broad perspective, the formation of environmental
strategy is a process of communication and network building among a variety of actors in
the society. Although environmental strategy typically is formulated by corporate
executives or government officials, its implementation is contingent upon the power
relations and structure of the policy networks. The Kola mining network is one such
policy network. It has attempted to achieve a strategic fit between complex utilization and
the socio-economic context in which the mining industry finds itself. Again, very
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different policy networks are found behind the adoption of the EMS or behind the clean-
up of the Pechenganikel plant. In the latter case, the environmental threat that
Pechenganikel posed to Norway was a nexus that connected engineers and politicians
across the Nordic countries to take action. These different environmental strategies have
not been any easier to fit into the local context, not the least due to the conflicting goals
between the members of the policy networks. In this concluding section, I will return to
the heuristic concept of emergence and place it in the context of the empirical material of
the dissertation.
7.1. Emergent Properties in the Kola Peninsula Case Study
The complexities involved in the implementation of environmental strategies in the Kola
Peninsula have been central to this introductory text. These complexities support the issue
of emergence in governance processes (e.g. in strategy and policymaking). The key point
in emergence is that it makes universalistic design models for strategy and policy of little
value. Understanding the emergent properties of governance processes in specific cases,
however, can guide decision making at least through analogies. In this dissertation, I have
presented one such analogy between complex utilization and industrial ecology.
Emergence becomes visible in the type of frames that the proponents have used in
marketing their strategies (complex utilization vis-à-vis industrial ecology) to wider
political audiences. Even frames that are ostensibly identical (efficiency, economy) reveal
context-specific meanings when examined in detail. What is more, entirely case specific
frames are needed for the successful political embedding of concepts such as industrial
ecology. These frames are very difficult to model or standardize a priori because they
emerge from context specific concerns, topics and particularities.
Another example of emergence in governance is found in indicators. New environmental
strategies may require production solutions that bring along unanticipated environmental
consequences. Indicator systems that help decision makers to anticipate future
environmental threats and make sense of complex interdependencies in the socio-
ecological system are needed. Our framework towards the cultural contextualization of
indicators is an attempt to incorporate this kind of “robustness” into governance
processes. Cultural contextualization of indicators is central to environmental strategy
and policy. A prime example is the Pechenganikel restructuring project: partners on both
sides of the border held eco-efficiency as a suitable indicator for project success. Their
underlying cultural storylines and the associated environmental impacts, however, were
different. In the end, the project partners had to redefine their understanding of the
acceptable level of production and pollution in order to carry out the project. A similar
dilemma is likely to occur in the future if the oil and gas industry will invest in the
transport and extraction in the Kola Peninsula. Monitoring the remote regions of the
peninsula will become topical as the unexploited (reindeer herding) regions will be
developed. This will also require consideration of the conflicting interests between
reindeer herders and oil companies.
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The point on interest conflict leads to my last example of emergent governance. Strategic
fit requires acknowledging those stakeholder groups who are most salient for legitimacy.
The trouble is, salience is not a fixed entity but varies over time and place. Stakeholder
urgency and power are variables that may require the Kola Peninsula mining industries to
redefine their environmental strategies. Stakeholder groups that are found irrelevant (the
Sámi people), latent (local NGOs) or expectant (the EU) today may become dominant in
the future. All this feeds back to the discussion on indicators above. Using stakeholder
salience (with its context specific variables) as a socio-ecological indicator may provide
valuable insight into emergent governance in future research. In the next subsection, I
will consider some limitations that this dissertation has not been able to cover and
introduce possible new avenues for post doctoral research.
7.2. Limitations and Future Research
Overall, the analysis of the storylines and frames of natural resource management in the
Kola Peninsula suggests a trend from holistic systems approaches towards fragmented
market-driven EMS. This trend has both positive and negative effects on environment
and equity. The rapid dismantling of Russian environmental governance has reduced the
incentive for the Russian companies to improve their environmental performance.
Therefore, at least large companies that operate on the international market are pushed
towards better environmental performance by consumers. The positive environmental
effect of the “invisible hand” may be substantial because the large companies have
traditionally been the worst polluters in Russia. The downside is that the environmental
performance of the smaller companies operating within Russia is regulated by neither the
government nor the market. Previously, in the system oriented models, the environmental
performance of the smaller companies was considered in concert with that of the larger
companies. This feature is lost with the dominating EMS approach to environmental
management. What is more, with decision making power being increasingly centred in
the headquarters of large industrial companies in Moscow and, in many cases, abroad, the
local communities that bear most of the negative impacts of environmental pollution are
left with little means to manage their own environment. Future research on the
environmental strategies of small and medium sized companies in Russia will benefit
from and contribute to this dissertation work.
In an important respect, the Kola Peninsula case study does not reveal how the pollution
induced environmental problems would de facto have changed with complex utilization
(Article 1). Environmental impacts of pollution typically depend on absolute levels of
pollutants. Eco-efficiency, being a relative measure, may lack explanatory power in such
large-scale systems as the Kola Peninsula Mining Complex. The analysis I have
conducted assesses possible reductions in given pollutants, which could have been
achieved with complex utilization (Article 1). It does not attempt to model specific
ecosystem effects related to those pollutants. The analysis suggests instead that industrial
ecological systems may require substantial waste material flows to be produced and then
again re-used. This is necessary for the industrial systems to work properly and to
maintain vital ecological functions of the biological ecosystems they are connected with.
54
Consequently, the argument boils down to the roots of industrial ecology: there is ample
evidence that biological ecosystems circulate excessive amounts of residual material (i.e.
they are inefficient on the level of a single organism), which is carefully assimilated
within the system (or by a system with completely different boundaries up to the level of
the entire biosphere). The key question is how this observation would work in industrial
systems. For complex utilization, there is a need to understand the magnitude to which
waste material flows can be increased to maintain the vital functions of a particular
region’s ecosystems. It is clear that these functions have not been maintained in the past,
i.e. in the absence of complex utilization. The dissertation does not answer the question
for the simple reason that complex utilization was never implemented in full scale. It
does, however, raise a relevant alternative to setting absolute pollution limits to single
industrial processes.
To avoid overburdening the reader in this introductory text, I have left out some of the
theoretical concepts that I used in the articles. The myth of nature (Article 3) is one such
concept. As opposed to cultural theory, myths of nature do not emerge from cultural
anthropology but, rather, from systems ecology (Holling, 1979, 1986). The strength of
these myths is that while they are clearly cultural products, they are at the same time
intimately connected to ecosystem dynamics. A single ecosystem, for instance, can be
extremely resilient towards disturbance at the early stages of its succession. At a later
stage the ecosystem resilience declines and the system is likely to be driven into chaos by
a small disturbance (Holling and Sanderson, 1996). What is more, ecosystem dynamics
does not converge towards a single global optimum but, rather, ecosystems experience a
number of local domains of stability during the course of their development. This means
that after a chaotic period, resilience is again restored (at some level) at a different
domain of stability (Ludwig, Walker et al, 1997).
Being both cultural products and rooted in observed ecosystem behaviour, myths of
nature yield a powerful alternative to devising human-environment indicators. More
broadly, Douglas’ cultural types have been used previously as heuristic boundary
conditions for integrated assessment modelling and future studies (van Asselt and
Rotmans, 2002). In that research, the construction of multiple perspective model routes
was guided by cultural types to give the modellers a limited variety of perspectives as
regards uncertainty (van Asselt and Rotmans, 2002). Clearly, further research is needed
in how to fit together the two domains. Alternative approaches to cultural bias worth
examining are political attitudes (Dake, 1991) and elite groups (Rothman and Lichter,
1987).
I would like to emphasize that I am relying on a “meta text” analysis, i.e. I have not
directly asked the interviewees to position themselves in the cultural theory framework.
Rather, I have analyzed the interview material and the publications by the Kola Mining
Network for both the indicators they wish to use at a given time and the rationale behind
those indicators. This method was found successful in “teasing out” the cultural
storylines. But the method also influences the results. The Kola Mining Network, for
example, being a main promoter of the complex utilization strategy, would be hard
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pushed to let out a fatalistic message to its stakeholders. After all, the members of the
network were (and still are) active scientists, politicians and industrialists strongly
devoted in the development of the Kola region. What is more, interviewees would be
likely in a face-to-face interview to overstate their active role, and thus understate any
fatalistic behaviour, for reasons of personal pride.
Finally, there is a strong emphasis on upstream processes in complex utilization. The
important note, however, is in the substitutes for virgin raw materials that complex
utilization would yield. Addressing the entire value chain of a product is an important
part of industrial ecology. I have limited the analysis of this thesis to the first stages of the
value chain, but the latter stages warrant further research.
8. About the Publications in this Dissertation
The first article of the series, Eco-Efficiency and Industrial Symbiosis - a Counterfactual
Analysis of a Mining Community, assesses eco-efficiency against industrial symbiosis in a
20-year time series model. It starts out by introducing how complex utilization, a
production model analogous to those described by industrial ecology, was planned at the
Russian KSC in mid-1980. The model, a key environmental strategy for the entire mining
industry of the region at the time, integrates the waste streams of the industry in such a
way that waste from one industrial operator becomes raw material for another. Using a
counterfactual method, the article determines the eco-efficiency of the model between the
years 1985 and 2005. A parallel study of the eco-efficiency of the actual system, i.e. in
the absence of complex utilization, is performed for the same time period.
The study shows that complex utilization would indeed have yielded increased eco-
efficiency, even though not all environmentally harmful emissions would have decreased.
As a result of market collapse and the use of upstream pollution prevention together with
traditional end-of-pipe technologies, however, the actual system shows net emission
reductions similar to those modelled in complex utilization. The article suggests that in
systems like the mining industry of the Kola Peninsula, with high production volumes
and poorly developed environmental technologies, upstream pollution prevention
together with traditional end-of-pipe technologies may prove more attractive than
industrial symbiosis, despite the substantial increases in eco-efficiency of the latter.
Industrial ecology may not deliver the expected gains in economic and ecological well-
being in non-Western contexts. Conversely, the article claims, even the most carefully
chosen environmental indicators will fail if they are set on rigid premises of what
constitutes a “good environment”.
It was my intention to continue the theme of Article 1 and assess the different aspects
(business potential, environmental issues, management issues) for complex utilization in
today’s world. After my second round of interviews, it stood clear that the mining
companies thought little of complex utilization in the form of a regionally integrated
system. This lack of interest has to do with the current general reluctance of the Kola
mining companies to collaborate with each other. The Soviet-time idea of the integrated
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complex utilization system requires a high degree of openness among the industries with
regard to process solutions. Such openness was found foreign in the current management
of the mining companies. At the same time, none of the interviewees denied the
importance of complex utilization in the extraction of the Kola Peninsula mineral
resources. They were just unable to express exactly how complex utilization should be
implemented.
Two things happened after the second round of interviews. First, it appeared that there
were multiple perceptions of and drivers for complex utilization among the mining
specialists, politicians and managers in the Kola Peninsula. Second, the environmental
management of the mining companies had rapidly converged toward adopting EMS.
Consequently, I analyzed the EMS in light of legitimacy and institutional forces in
Article 2. The EMS provided one clear sign of how environmental management in the
Kola Peninsula is changing. I wanted, however, to get at the wealth of different ideas and
changes in the environmental field. Articles 3 and 4 therefore focus exclusively on the
different scientific and political dimensions of complex utilization, and how these have
changed during the past decades. Obviously, I am only able to scratch the surface of the
ideas and changes in the two articles: “Europeanization” of environmental policy and
management has occurred to an extent but at the same time ideas from complex
utilization add to the ways in which environmental problems are framed and solved.
Frame analysis and cultural theory worked well for the purposes of finding out about the
specific kinds of environmental management and policy being practiced in the Kola
Peninsula.
The second article of the series, Drivers for Adopting Environmental Management
Systems in the Post-Soviet Mining Industry, describes the effects that the privatization of
the Russian industry together with organizational changes in the federal government have
had on environmental policy and management in the Kola Peninsula. The article starts
out by claiming that the past decade has witnessed a coherent dismantling of public
environmental policy in Russia. At the same time, Russian companies involved in natural
resources extraction have adopted standardized EMS. In this way, much of the
responsibility of environmental policy in Russia has been transferred to private industries
and their management systems. These systems do not, as such, guarantee increased
environmental responsibility. The article addresses the privatization of the Russian
environmental policy in light of legitimacy and uncertainty involved in standardized
EMS.
The Kola Peninsula mining industry’s attempts to gain legitimacy from various
stakeholders were reflected in the reasons that corporate executives gave for adopting
EMS. In the empirical work, 16 mining executives (of the 52 interviewees in Table 2)
were asked to describe the style and structure of environmental management in their
companies. The interviewees were further asked for specific reasons for adoption of EMS
in their company. Statements describing why the companies adopt and maintain EMS
were extracted from the transcribed interview data. Similar statements were categorized
according to common environmental drivers in the mining industry found in previous
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research. In addition, the salience of stakeholder groups granting legitimacy was assessed
in terms of three variables: power, stakeholder group’s own legitimacy, and urgency.
The case study is used in two ways in Article 2. First, environmental policy conflicts
between public bodies and mining companies in Russia are illustrated with two case
examples. Second, key drivers for adopting EMS in the Kola Peninsula mining
companies are extracted from thematic interviews. The identified drivers are market
pressure, stakeholder pressure, regulatory pressure, organizational culture and learning,
and the influence of individuals. These drivers are analyzed for their impact on unit and
corporate level decision making. In addition, the drivers are categorized according to the
type of legitimacy and stakeholder salience that they reflect. It is shown that unit and
corporate level applications of environmental management have different societal and
environmental implications. Furthermore, while market pressure appears to be the most
significant driver both in terms of legitimacy and stakeholder salience, the remaining four
drivers bear significance in the local-level processes for sustainability. On the basis of the
case study it is suggested that the support of latent and expectant stakeholder groups may
increase the moral legitimacy of the corporation’s operations and therefore allow a better
alignment of corporate goals with societal goals of sustainability.
The third article of the series, Cultural contextualization of indicators of human-
environment interaction: The case of the Kola mining network, which I have written
together with Janne Hukkinen, returns to the problematic of human-environment
indicators laid out in Article 1. In the third article we developed and tested a framework
for addressing the socio-cultural dimension of environmental indicators, such as eco-
efficiency in the previous article. The third article combines cultural theory with indicator
theory and assesses the case study of the Kola Peninsula mining industry in a 70-year
time span. We identified indicators with which the Kola mining network has measured
the performance of mining operations since the 1920s in three consecutive time periods:
1920s to 1930s, the late 1970s to the early 1990s, and the early 1990s onwards.
It should be noted that the time period between the 1930s and the 1970s is missing
because, to our knowledge, the development of complex utilization was halted after the
Second World War and re-initiated only in the mid-to-late 1970s8. We analyzed the
cultural contextualization of human-environment indicators related to complex
utilization. In spite of significant attempts, we have obtained no empirical material related
to complex utilization between late 1930s and late 1970s. Because of the fact that the
analysis focused on complex utilization, it does not yield knowledge of the cultural types
related to other production strategies that have appeared in the region, particularly
between the Second World War and the late 1970s. It is possible that a prolonged
hierarchic storyline prevailed throughout the 1950s and 1960s but, due to the lack of
empirical evidence, we were unable to make that claim.
Overall, the third article shows further that it is possible, partly, to escape the
contingencies in indicator design in a way that is better linked to the cultural history of
the specific region. It is expected that the framework for cultural contextualization of
8 Interview with a senior scientist at the Kola Science Center, 2004
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indicators allows planners involved in international co-operation to better align specific
indicators with the local diversity of values.
In detail, the article employs cultural theory, indicator theory and research on ecological
modernization to create a framework for assessing indicators of human-environment
interaction in different cultural contexts. In the framework, indicators are articulated in
terms of two cultural indexes: myth of nature and scope of knowledge. This articulation is
conducted with a case study of the Kola mining network, which is defined as a group of
individuals who are connected to each other through the physical mining activity of the
Kola Peninsula, and who have been key decision makers of environmental and natural
resources management in the region.
The article delivers a result general for the practical application of sustainability
indicators: no indicator or indicator value can be regarded as an objective measure of the
sustainability of a social-ecological system, but ought instead to be interpreted with
explicit reference to the particular cultural storyline in which the system operates. This
result emerges from the empirical account of how the set of indicators on one hand and
indicator bandwidths on the other shape and are shaped by culture. In addition, the article
contributes to the development of international environmental co-operation in the North.
The analysis contradicts the widely-held notion that Russia has moved from a hierarchic
directly into an individualistic cultural domain. We illustrate how, between these two
domains, an egalitarian cultural storyline has played an important role in the shaping of
human-environment indicators in the Kola Peninsula. We conclude with policy
recommendations relevant for the co-operation that the international community is
currently promoting in North-West Russia.
Finally, the fourth article of the series, Embedding Science in Politics—“Complex
Utilization” and Industrial Ecology as Models of Natural Resource Use, which I have
written together with Aino Toppinen, continues to explore the cultural contextualization
of science-based sustainability standards. In detail, the article analyzes the ways in which
scientific concepts such as complex utilization and industrial ecology are framed in
different socio-cultural contexts. A key contribution of the article is that it reveals
previously hidden patterns of political embedding of scientific models for human-
environment interaction. We claim that industrial ecology has devoted limited attention to
the ways in which the technical models of industrial ecology both shape and are shaped
by social processes. Yet, the practitioners of industrial ecology frequently encounter
challenges pertaining to contextualization when embedding the general model in different
local contexts. In addition, we claim that the models of industrial ecological systems
become politically meaningful only when they are carefully contextualized and linked to
local needs.
In order to get an understanding of the political embedding of industrial ecology, we
conduct a frame analysis of complex utilization – defined as a scientific policy instrument
analogous to industrial ecology. We identify five frames (nature, efficiency, economy,
science and self-sufficiency) with which complex utilization has been promoted between
1935 and 2005 within the Kola Peninsula mining community. These frames are then
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compared to six frames (environment, efficiency, economy, sustainability, mental
proximity, awareness) identified in the industrial symbiosis in Kalundborg, Denmark. We
find that effective political embedding relies on frames that function both on a general
level and in the local context. General frames, such as efficiency, economy and the
environment, need to be aligned with local perceptions of the particular issues. What is
more, sensitivity to purely context-specific frames, such as self-sufficiency and
awareness, is necessary for effective political embedding. Finally, we illustrate how the
political processes of framing also shape the scientific-technical models that are being
promoted.
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